NZSAS transparency follows other secretive agencies stepping out of shadows - Dr Rhys Ball

OPINION: Our most elite fighting force, the NZSAS has this week shared with the public new context around what it does. It has walked a line – sharing some details to better inform the public without letting dangerous secrets loose. It’s a positive step towards increased transparency around national security, writes Dr Rhys Ball.

This week the NZSAS released a positioning document called Te Maia Hei Toa. This new and increased transparency reflects a contemporary approach to understanding national security and the broader framework within which it manifests here in New Zealand.

For a long time, we have seen the perceived and real “failures” - as they are described - litigated out in the open.

But what has often been missing is the context and the activities leading up to those events. They simply haven’t been known.

This has created perceptions of hidden activity that in turn can affect the sensibilities of the New Zealand public – who largely hold openness and transparency among their most cherished values.

In the post-inquiry into the Operation Burnham period, an Expert Review Group was put together to examine some of the key findings of the Burnham Inquiry.

NZSAS troopers working through the British Council Office in Kabul in 2011 after insurgents attacked and took hostages. Photo / NZDF

Its report offered a set of nine recommendations. Most were directed at the working relationships between the New Zealand Defence Force and the Ministry of Defence – so some key operational and policy areas. But more specifically it looked at how the New Zealand special forces community needed to contribute to providing a better understanding of its role in modern warfare and national security.

The document that we see here begins to explain this in an open and reasonably transparent way; albeit as transparent as we can expect from a strategic capability like special forces.

These two components - modern warfare and national security - are important. We are unlikely to see a particularly detailed explanation of how New Zealand special forces conduct the former, nor would you expect to. Remember, adversaries and potential adversaries will be reading the same material. But we can certainly get a better sense of where our special forces sit with the latter.

We hear about this every day. The Whakaari White Island work is a case in point with the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron - E Squadron of the NZSAS - deployed to search for survivors and recover victims. Every time someone discovers in their garage that hand-grenade grandad brought back from World War II, or a suspicious package has been left at a bus stop or train station, or a road-side bomb needs diffusing, it is the New Zealand special forces who resolve it.

Increased transparency has been tried before. In the 2007 documentary series, First Among Equals, we saw examples of NZSAS work and its role in the early 21st century, and details of Willie Apiata’s exploits further strengthened this narrative.

This week’s release of Te Maia Hei Toa appears to be a further - and more contemporary - example of how the roles and functions of special forces can be described and explained to a wider audience without risking security. I think that New Zealand special forces have taken a leaf out of the New Zealand Intelligence Community’s approach in the wake of the Kitteridge Report into the GCSB and the findings of the Royal Commission on Inquiry into the March 15 attacks.

Public discomfort over Afghan raid

It is important to note that for the New Zealand public, disclosures related to Operation Burnham did create some sense of discomfort about the military activities of the NZSAS, which was not alleviated by the Inquiry or the Expert Review Group findings.

So, this week’s document release is likely an effort to reshape that public opinion by the national security system itself, of which the SAS is a part.

I don’t see this as manipulation - I see it as an opportunity to assist in “strengthening and maintaining trust, confidence and credibility” - one of the objectives set by the Expert Review Group – in what our special forces stand for and how they contribute to our safety and security.

I think the public largely believes in what our defence people - including our special forces people - do. We can see this in Operation Protect, we can see this in Operation Kokako, and other humanitarian assistance operations.

New Zealand special forces personnel during the evacuation of Kabul airport in 2021. Photo / NZDF

While the vignettes and details within the document will be familiar to some, take a look at some of the timelines; the speed at which these people can deploy is truly impressive.

And we can also go back to the days when Readers Digest and other media issued surveys listing the most trusted New Zealanders. In 2011, there were two SAS soldiers in the Herald’s list of top 20 Kiwis (Governor General Jerry Mateparae and Corporal Willie Apiata). Since then, Willie Apiata has consistently placed in the top two.

There are some gaps - some outstanding issues that do not appear to have been addressed in this document - and I wonder whether these need to be identified and managed sooner rather than later before they present themselves as a problem in the future.

Who has oversight on intelligence collection?

One of those is that it is unclear exactly who the audience for the document might be.

I am not convinced that it is for the broader public. Nor am I convinced that the broader public is all that interested in defence and security issues – and although this needs to change, it is not the responsibility of our Defence Forces to make it change.

I suspect that it is more targeted to domestic and international security partners. When the special forces suggest in the document that one of their key tasks is to ensure “international partners understand the New Zealand policy context within which we operate,” this is clearly code for making sure any coalition partners know what we can do and what we can’t do.

New Zealand special forces evacuating people from Kabul, Afghanistan, in 2021 as the Taliban once again took control of the country. Photo / NZDF

Another area of concern might be the murkiness of the rules around intelligence gathering. It is clear from the document that New Zealand special forces “inform strategic and operational intelligence as requested by Defence and other security agencies”. Now I am not asking for precise details about what this is, but if it is in fact an intelligence collector – then who has oversight responsibility?

One of the criticisms of the past has been that there is limited information about what New Zealand special forces do, how they do things and, importantly, why. I believe that this document will fill some of these blanks.

I don’t feel that this document presents some watershed moment that discloses state secrets - or operational methods - to any adversaries.

Unnecessary secrecy abounds within the broader national security system here in this country and it is certainly not just New Zealand Special Forces or NZDF who are responsible for this either.

Irrespective of this, I do think that it is now time for our special forces to take the Operation Burnham legacy “on the chin” and move forward.

I am a strong believer that they have done this and, like other elements of our national security apparatus, the publication of the likes of Te Maia Hei Toa is one further step on that journey.

• Dr Rhys Ball is a senior lecturer with Massey University’s security studies programme. He has researched and written on NZSAS history and the role of New Zealand’s special forces.

Former NZSIS officer turned security studies academic, Dr Rhys Ball. Photo / NZME