September 23, 2005
NZ follow-up: HSPD-6 terrorist lookout information sharing initiative

SUBJECT: NZ FOLLOW-UP: HSPD-6 TERRORIST LOOKOUT INFORMATION

SHARING INITIATIVE

REF: A. SECSTATE 173539

Advertisement

B. STATE 158827

Classified By: Charge D'Affaires David R. Burnett,

for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S) Post IWG agencies met to discuss Ref A and B. We

also discussed the possibility of the terrorist lookout

information sharing pilot with Conoff in Auckland. Agencies

all agree that GNZ would be a good candidate for the proposed

pilot project, and would likely be receptive should we make

Advertisement

this request. If Washington decides to pursue this project,

we recommend that, as a first step, Post raise the issue with

Mary Anne Thompson, Deputy Secretary at the Department of

Labour. Thompson is currently charged with overseeing much

of NZ's immigration policy, including counter-terrorism

measures. She is an invaluable behind-the-scenes Embassy

contact. Thompson has worked as a staffer for two Prime

Ministers and has in the past provided us with valuable

insights about how best to sell U.S. policies within GNZ.

She is also generally sympathetic with USG counter-terrorism

policies in the region.

2. (S) Agencies also reviewed the questions provided Ref B,

and offer the following preliminary answers. We should be

able to provide more detailed information if and when we are

instructed to approach GNZ on this issue:

A. (SBU) What, if any, arrangements already exist for the

systematic sharing of terrorist lookout information with GNZ?

-- (S) Post Liaison officers, PE, and DCM all regularly

share information with GNZ at Washington's request. GNZ

regularly, and informally, shares information with CONS in

Auckland at the working level. NSA and GCSB (NZ's NSA

equivalent) also regularly share information. With the

exception of NSA/GCSB exchanges, which are automated, all

post/GNZ information is exchanged through person-to-person

contacts.

B) Does the GNZ currently maintain unclassified lookout

information on individuals based on terrorist-related

information? Does the GNZ maintain classified or restricted

lookout information on individuals based on terrorist-related

information?

-- (S) Airlines maintain unclassified passenger lists.

Customs maintains an unclassified database for use by

Immigration's border control agents. The data includes tips

for identification, and may also advise agents to contact

authorities if a person in the data base is positively

identified. Customs also maintains classified data bases.

C) If the answer to either or both question is yes, how is

this information maintained? Is it consolidated in one

database or are there multiple databases with this

information? Are these databases automated?

-- (S) As noted above, there are separate databases, all of

which are automated. The unclassified Customs/Immigration

databases include unclassified instructions based on

information contained in the classified Customs database.

Many of the "tips" for identification included in the

unclassified databases are based on information that post

SIPDIS

liaisons have provided to GNZ via the NZ Security Services

(NZSIS). GNZ agencies are currently trying to improve their

internal data sharing. Our Consular Section Chief notes that

the data GNZ has provided the Consulate is usually of high

quality and seems readily retrievable.

D) Which biographic elements are included in the GNZ's

terrorist-related lookout system(s) (examples: name, date of

birth, citizenship, passport number, mother's maiden

name). Are biometrics, specifically fingerprints, associated

with the lookout system(s)?

-- (S) All the referenced data points are included in GNZ's

classified databases, assuming the agencies have that

information. Most information is included in the

unclassified databases as well. The classified databases

SIPDIS

also include individual's distinguishing marks. Although

police have some biometrics (fingerprints) in their database,

to our knowledge these are not included in the lookout system

databases.

E) Which biographic and/or biometric elements on an

individual are considered mandatory for the GNZ to use that

information in the country's terrorist-related lookout

system(s)? What are the definitions and evidentiary standards

used by the GNZ to determine whether an individual gets

placed on the terrorist-related lookout system?

-- (S) Post is not familiar with GNZ procedures in this area.

F) With the GNZ under which department or entities are the

terrorist-related lookout systems maintained? What are the

internal sharing arrangements? Does the host-country

share terrorist information with other countries, i.e. Brunei

and Singapore?

-- (S) See above for information regarding which agencies

maintain lookout systems, as well as internal sharing

systems. From time to time, GNZ officials have told us that

they are sharing terrorist information with other countries,

but we are not familiar with any formal mechanisms that may

be in place to facilitate such exchanges.

G) How does the GNZ use terrorist-related lookout information

in screening processes? For the screening of visa applicants?

For screening at ports of entry? For internal law enforcement

purposes? For any other screening purposes?

-- (S) GNZ uses its terrorist-related lookout information to

screen visa applicants and applicants at the port of entry.

Recently, GNZ missions abroad made a couple of high-profile

immigration errors concerning former members of Saddam's

regime. As a result, GNZ is in the process of changing its

visa-processing system so that all visa decisions involving

countries of concern will be adjudicated by GNZ officials in

Wellington. (SBU) During the recent election campaign, GNZ

officials said that 63 individuals had been barred entry into

New Zealand over the past two years because they had been

positively identified in GNZ lookout systems as security

risks.

H) Which legal authorities guide the GNZ's use of

terrorist-related lookout information?

-- (S) The Counter-terrorism Act of 2002, as amended, is the

primary legislation guiding GNZ's counter-terrorism lookout

data bases and related policies.

I) How do any of the GNZ's privacy laws or their equivalent

influence the use of terrorist-related information?

-- (S) GNZ's counter-terrorism provisions have been

criticized by some, including the Green Party, as being an

infringement of privacy. However, the Attorney General sent

a report to Parliament in 2002 that said nothing in New

Zealand's primary Counter-terrorism legislation (The

Counter-terrorism Bill 2002) appeared inconsistent with the

New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.

J) Does the GNZ have legal authorities or instruments to make

terrorist-related lookout information accessible to other

countries? Are there impediments that could inhibit

making this terrorist-related information accessible to other

countries? Does the GNZ have an equivalent entity to the

Terrorist Screening Center?

-- (S) Given our intelligence-sharing relationship with New

Zealand, we are not aware of any impediments to GNZ's sharing

with us of any terrorist-related lookout information. As we

have noted, such exchanges already take place. We are not

familiar with NZ policies concerning exchanges with other

countries. There is no GNZ equivalent to the Terrorist

Screening Center, although as we noted above GNZ is making an

effort to improve screening coordination among its various

agencies.

Burnett