While hedging is an optimal foreign policy for smaller countries to deal with worsening great power rivalry, it is often a difficult strategy to execute. One only has to look at Ukraine's failure to hedge the West and Russia and the crisis that it subsequently helped ignite to realise that the stakes are very high when it comes to foreign policy-making in these situations.
However, New Zealand, unlike Ukraine or practically any other country currently attempting to hedge great powers (whether in Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, or the Middle East), has some big advantages which makes hedging a less costly and potentially rewarding strategy.
Firstly, New Zealand is blessed that, because of its geographic position, it does not actually reside in a regional security complex: a regional setting which is extremely geopolitically interconnected and sensitive.
The regional aspect is important because as London School of Economics Professor Barry Buzan argues, "most political and military threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones" so "insecurity is often associated with proximity".
Residing in a regional security complex makes hedging more difficult because, as was the case with Ukraine, the decisions of even the smallest countries create ripples that are felt by the larger ones.
Therefore, the fact New Zealand does not reside in an insecure regional setting is extremely fortunate and removes any significant structural barriers to hedging. In fact, I would wager that New Zealand is in the most advantageous geopolitical position out of any country in the world.
Secondly, while New Zealand's relative smallness probably precludes us from being a "bridge" between China and the United States, it is actually an advantage when it comes to hedging.
New Zealand has long used its smallness – aided by our credible soft power capabilities - to play the role of an honest broker. And while New Zealand's once lauded reputation for speaking truth to power has faded in recent years – especially since it became an active participant in the United States' post-Cold War order – it is still unequivocally a non-threatening country in the eyes of greater powers.
Importantly, effective hedging not only requires an ability to project a non-threatening appearance but also that foreign policies are signalled in a way that is not too blunt. In other words, hedging requires foreign policies that are somewhat ambiguous in order to create uncertainty as to which side of the hedge (i.e. which partner) is the most important.
This is perhaps the hardest aspect of hedging as it requires significant statecraft such like that of Josip Broz (Tito) who famously pursued a strategy of non-alignment strategy during the Cold War. Titos don't grow on trees and whether New Zealand has the ability to effectively signal a hedge remains a big question.
The worsening relationship between China and the United States is, of course, worrying and New Zealand needs to adapt its strategies to deal with this emerging new reality.
However, falling into the mindset that we essentially have to choose a side would be both suboptimal and, quite frankly, a complete misread of our capabilities.
And while David Parker might be a little ambitious with his idea of bridging the two sides, his thinking is, to my mind, on the right path as to how New Zealand should approach the growing Asia-Pacific security conundrum.
New Zealander Nicholas Ross Smith is an Assistant Professor of International Studies at the University of Nottingham Ningbo China
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Nicholas_Smith27