The DefenceMinister says she is acting in the interests of New Zealand, not Australia, the US or the Philippines.
She wants New Zealand to act like “a real country” in Defence and bring something to the party.
When Defence Minister Judith Collins went to the Philippines last week to sign an agreement with its armed forces, two different versions emerged about what it meant.
The one prevailing in the Philippines itself – and its close ally, the United States– is that New Zealand is part of an expanding group of supporters being enlisted to help its resistance in territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea.
The headline in the Washington Post, taken from an agency at the Philippines press conference, said “Philippines signs military pact with New Zealand to widen alliances while facing an assertive China”.
The view was similar to one expressed by Collins’ counterpart, Gilberto Teodoro jnr, who told reporters in February that the pending agreement was an important part of initiatives “to resist China’s unilateral narrative to change international law”.
Collins’ version is more circumspect when describing the “status of visiting forces agreement” this week in a Beehive interview with the Herald.
“From our point of view, it is similar to arrangements we have, for instance, with Tuvalu and Fiji.”
It was an agreement on the legal requirements of New Zealand visiting forces being in the Philippines if, for example, a New Zealand plane that was taking part in monitoring sanctions on North Korea broke down, or New Zealand was involved in HADR (human assistance and disaster relief).
“They have around 30 cyclones a year,” Collins said.
It might also mean more training with the Philippines military but she rejected a suggestion that, given the ongoing tensions and the potential flashpoint between the Philippines and China, it was a provocative move.
“No. What is provocative is for anybody to think it is anything more than what it is.”
And if the tensions there were to erupt, would New Zealand join the conflict against China?
“I would see that as not being a decision of the Minister of Defence,” Collins said.
“I like to hope that that won’t happen and one of the ways in which to prevent that sort of behaviour is to be very clear about our own behaviour and what we expect. But that would not be a matter for me to decide.”
During Collins’ term as minister, China has become more assertive around Taiwan and in the South China Sea; more active in the Pacific, including signing an agreement with the Cook Islands, a Realm Country of New Zealand, without consulting New Zealand; test-firing a ballistic missile into the Pacific; and sending a naval task group to the Tasman Sea in February, which included live-firing without notice.
The Defence Capability Plan is specific about China, referring to its “assertive pursuit” of its strategic objectives and saying it uses all the tools of statecraft in ways that can challenge international norms of behaviour and the security of other states”.
“Of particular concern is the rapid and non-transparent growth of China’s military capability ... ”
Since being appointed Defence Minister in November 2023 – a job Collins has always wanted – she is leading the forces through a period of great change in relationships and spending, including:
Overseeing a new Defence Capability Plan with a big increase in spending for upgrades of $12 billion over four years, including new lethal missile systems;
Announcing the first big project under the plan to replace the Seasprite helicopters for about $2 billion;
Aiming to get New Zealand to spend 2% of GDP on Defence by 2033;
Deepening interoperability with Australia and development of a more integrated Anzac force;
Reviving the use of “Anzus” in the context of Australia, the former three-way security alliance from which the US froze out New Zealand in 1986;
Stepping up defence diplomacy, especially with Nato, Nato partners Japan and South Korea in the Pacific (IP4) and with the UK.
Overseeing the response to the sinking of the HMNZS Manawanui in October.
So, where does Collins say she is taking New Zealand on Defence?
“We are just trying to be significantly more responsive, to be able to go where we are needed but also to be able to stand up and say ‘we’re pulling our weight in the world’.
“We shouldn’t always be asking someone else to give us their second-hand stuff, which is what has happened in the past ... We’re actually going to turn up and act like a real country, and that’s what we’re doing.”
None of the advances were foreshadowed in National’s Defence policy manifesto before the last election, which was largely worded in bland generalities such as “National strongly supports our defence co-operation with our only formal ally, Australia”, “National strongly supports New Zealand’s commitment to [Five Eyes]” and “New Zealand must be open to working with other countries who share our values”.
The United States was not mentioned other than in reference to being a member of the Five Eyes intelligence agreement.
When asked this week if there was any doubt she was moving New Zealand towards the United States’ interests, she said: “I think we are moving closer towards New Zealand’s interests.”
“Our interests have to be around the Pacific. We’ve seen what’s happened in the Cook Islands. We’ve seen what’s happened in the Tasman Sea recently.
“The fact is New Zealand has to be there and it has to turn up on time with the right equipment and the right personnel and we need to be able to project not only New Zealand’s image but what we do.”
New Zealand soldiers, sailors and aviators were very well thought of around the world.
“The only thing missing is the kit to go with them. My view is if we are going to ask people to do things, we have to support them.”
Judith Collins appearing before the foreign affairs, trade and defence committee in December last year. Photo / Mark Mitchell
And whether or not she had an electoral mandate to deepen military relationships to the extent she has, it is now elevated as Government policy as one of three main objectives in the Defence Capability Plan: “Enhance the Anzus alliance with Australia and New Zealand’s most important security partnerships.”
Collins on Australia: “We’ve been an ally since post World War II, we’ve been Anzac Corp since World War I, we’ve been together forever. I think it’s just part of our DNA ...
“As for the United States, of course, we work closely with the United States. We always have. There’s no particular angst with us. The same for Canada and the UK. We’ve always worked closely with those countries.”
New Zealand also worked closely with Singapore and Malaysia, Japan and South Korea, Fiji, Tonga and Papua New Guinea.
While Collins spoke with her US counterpart Pete Hegseth on February 7, it is not yet clear what the stance of the new Trump administration will be in the Pacific and whether it will remain as committed as the Biden administration.
Foreign Minister Winston Peters has lobbied Washington to remain involved, although its aid programme has been gutted.
But there is some irony in the fact that at the very time New Zealand is preaching the importance of the rules-based order, the United States has disregarded that in relation to trade tariffs, which in many cases breach trade agreements, and respect for sovereign borders (potentially Canada, Greenland, Panama and Ukraine).
Collins has her own perspective: “We are enormous beneficiaries of the rules-based order,” she said.
“Just because one particular party or two particular parties or big players are not speaking about it as much as we are, that doesn’t stop us.
“Two wrongs never make a right, do they?”
She said that while New Zealand was a small player, it called out big ones in various ways if they were doing things that were not in New Zealand’s best interests.
“We are not the world’s police people. We are not in charge of the world. We are a small price-taker essentially from the world,” she said.
“I think of things like respecting the law of the sea is really important because that really works for us in trade. We are not doing it for Australia, we are not doing it for the Philippines, we are doing it for ourselves. It is in our best interests that the law of the sea is respected.”
She acknowledged that the United States had not signed up to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) but it appeared to be enforcing it, whereas China had signed up to it.
“The world is full of irony. We deal with what we’ve got. I’m not going to go around and wag my finger at every other country. I just do my job.”
