Dialogue: Madness that keeps doomsday clock ticking despite end of the Cold War

It is wrong to say that the world is safe enough for New Zealand to again place itself under the nuclear umbrella, writes ALEXANDER GILLESPIE*.

Denis McLean's dialogue piece on Wednesday suggesting it is necessary to reverse New Zealand's nuclear-free policy misses all the main reasons it is essential that it be maintained.

His main contentions are twofold. The first is that nuclear energy, which powers these ships, is a safe fuel and does not represent a serious risk through port visits.

The second, more implicit, point is that the policy was much better suited to the Cold War when there was a clear threat between the two superpowers.

With regard to his first contention, the debate about the safety of nuclear energy is far from certain, although his basic point about the overall safety of nuclear-powered vessels is correct so far.

As an overall threat, the nuclear accidents from nuclear energy that have occurred have all been land-based, in Britain, the former Soviet Union, Japan and (almost) the United States.

As such, the safety record of travelling nuclear vessels is good. Unfortunately, the waste these may create (and which may have to be housed for thousands of years) is more problematic, as is the fact that such vessels are, most probably, desirable targets for all those with opposing nuclear hardware or terrorist intentions.

Post-September 11 analysis has already revealed the worst-case scenarios of targeting nuclear energy reactors.

But this is not the real threat that nuclear visits represent, and to engage in such discussions is to accept the red herring that was put forward in Denis McLean's article.

The real threat that nuclear visits from military forces represents is crawling back under the nuclear umbrella, which is much more fragile than Denis McLean would suggest.

He implies that times have moved on, and the policy that may have once been well suited to the Cold War is unsuitable for the new century.

Nothing could be further from correct, because nuclear safety in our increasingly globalising world is far from secure.

One of the best indicators of this is the minutes-to-midnight clock set by the directors of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. The clock symbolises how close humanity is to nuclear conflict and possible extinction. Extinction is probable if a full-scale nuclear exchange occurs. To strike midnight is the end point. This fictional clock, which was first set at seven minutes to midnight in 1945, is now back at the same place as when it started - seven minutes to midnight.

This is not something to consider an achievement.

At the end of the Cold War, the clock was significantly wound back, but since then it has moved forward, three times since 1991. The last move happened this month when the clock was moved from nine minutes to seven minutes.

The reason the doomsday clock is moving back quickly towards midnight is only partly due to the fact that 31,000 nuclear weapons are maintained by the eight superpowers.

Many of these have less than 30 minutes between firing and hitting their targets.

The clock is also moving forward because of the failure of the US, and subsequently the international community, to accept the Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty, the failure of the international community to make the (nuclear) Non-Proliferation Treaty meaningful and tied to specific targets, the failure of the US to maintain the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the failure of the international community to agree on adequate verification procedures for chemical and biological weapons.

In addition, there is the problem of nuclear terrorism (18 cases of theft of weapon-grade uranium or plutonium since 1991 from the former Soviet Union), madmen flying jet airliners into civilian targets, and continuing border skirmishes, including an attack on India's Parliament, between the nuclear powers of Pakistan and India.

Of late, we may also throw the highly volatile situation of nuclear-armed, provocative and surrounded Israel into the equation.

Any suggestion that the world is safe and that it is suitable for countries such as New Zealand to reacquaint themselves with the nuclear umbrella is mistaken.

Denis McLean suggests that our nuclear-free policy should be traded because it is ultimately inconsistent with our vital national interests with the US.

He is probably correct that it does not further our relationship with the United States.

But New Zealand's considerations in the pursuit of global security, and a world free of the near unimaginable risk of nuclear war, must be a much higher consideration.

Maintaining our nuclear-free status is an intrinsic part of that.

* Dr Alexander Gillespie is the listed New Zealand expert on natural resource matters at the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.