KEY POINTS:
In all likelihood, Graham Henry will decide of his own accord to resign as All Black coach. At the end of the four weeks or so he is taking to review his options after the crushing disappointment of the World Cup quarter-final loss to France, he will probably
conclude it is time to step down.
Various factors, most notably his lengthy tenure in some of the game's most high-pressure positions, will weigh on him. One that should not is that the reins will be taken from him as a matter of course.
This knee-jerk reaction has, regrettably, been the norm for New Zealand rugby in the World Cup era. Accountability has been a rigid doctrine, no matter the mitigating circumstances.
Henry's predecessor, John Mitchell, had his case for reappointment rejected summarily after a semifinal defeat in 2003. John Hart was treated similarly four years earlier. Both men had, to their cost, alienated sectors of the rugby community. But Mitchell, especially, had an impressive record outside the World Cup, and would have emerged from the setback a more capable and rounded coach.
Henry, paradoxically, finds himself in a far stronger position, even though his team fell at an earlier hurdle. Unlike Mitchell, he has not offended sponsors and the media or made the All Blacks inaccessible to the public.
This campaign was notable for the players' smiling response to outsiders' inquiries. Polls suggest Henry retains a steady public backing, and that his reappointment would not be greeted by widespread outrage.
To some degree, this is remarkable. The three strands that Henry sought to weave together to prevent a repetition of past mistakes - reconditioning, rotation and shared leadership responsibility - failed to withstand a French examination. Rotation and reconditioning were strongly contested by traditionalists when they were introduced, yet the public seems to have been won over by them despite the Cardiff loss. There is also very little dissatisfaction with team selection, even though, as in 1999 and 2003, the team's best fullback was required, with predictable consequences, to fill in at centre.
Nor has there been much criticism levelled at Henry over the leadership failure against France. In the final 10 minutes, when the All Blacks were in full control, none of the much-touted group of leaders stepped forward to dictate a winning formula. Mental toughness, a supposed plus of this side, proved a myth.
Henry and his fellow coaches can, therefore, hardly escape some of the blame for the All Blacks' demise. If they wish to retain their jobs, they will have to state very convincingly what they have learned and how they will get things right in 2011. In their favour is the fact that many people seem to believe Henry was close to the right recipe, and failed mainly because of poor decision-making by a young English referee. And that further tweaking of the rotation system and reconditioning, and the selection of more astute on-field leaders, would be rewarded at the 2011 Cup.
The strength of that sentiment adds weight to the view that Henry should not be dismissed out of hand. Rugby's administrators must ponder whether his strategy, particularly its absolute focus on the World Cup, was so badly flawed as to be irredeemable. If they think so, Henry and his assistants, Wayne Smith and Steve Hansen, must go. An obvious replacement, Robbie Deans, waits in the wings. He has already hinted at a different approach, most notably through requiring the All Blacks' top XV to play far more as a team.
But the appointment of Deans would not necessarily spell the end of many of Henry's ways of doing things. That method has made a lasting statement in all but one knock-out tournament. Neither it nor its originator deserves automatic dismissal.