"Whaleoil" blogger Cameron Slater has had a second appeal against his conviction for breaching name suppression orders rejected.
After being turned down by the High Court, Slater applied unsuccessfully for special leave to take his case to the Court of Appeal.
The controversial blogger was found guilty after a defended hearing in the Auckland District Court last year of eight charges of breaching name suppression orders and another of identifying a victim in a sex case.
He was fined $750 on each count - a total of $6750.
The Court of Appeal, in its judgement released today said: "It should be noted that Mr Slater deliberately published on his blog the details giving rise to these charges."
It was part of his campaign to disclose publicly the names of people granted suppression orders in criminal proceedings in the District Court.
"His general modus operandi was to disclose information which would lead to a defendant's identification," the judgement said. Slater unsuccessfully appealed to the High Court against both conviction and sentence.
However, he was subsequently granted leave to go to the Court of Appeal on a question of law: "Whether the information or material posted on his "Whaleoil" blog constituted a publication of a 'report or account' in breach of the Criminal Justice Act 1995."
That appeal has yet to be heard.
Meanwhile, Slater sought special leave to appeal against his conviction on five additional questions of law.
His lawyer Gregory Thwaite argued that, because leave had been granted on one question of law, the whole judgement was therefore subject to appeal.
Leave given for one question of law necessarily meant leave was given for all the proposed questions, he said.
There was no general right of appeal, the judgement found.
"The granting of leave on one question does not thereby open the door to argue a range of questions for which leave has been specifically sought and refused."
Dismissing Slater's application, the Court of Appeal concluded: "We are not satisfied that any of the proposed questions of law are arguable. It follows that none of them meet the statutory threshold for granting special leave."