Diggers forced to defend Japanese

John Howard had much more on his mind than pop concerts at Gallipoli and regulation of banks when he prepared to meet New Zealand's political and business elite in Auckland last Monday.

The previous Friday he received an unsettling phone call from his Japanese counterpart, Junichiro Koizumi, asking for troops and armour to protect military engineers working in the southern Iraq province of Al Muthanna. Under the Japanese constitution Koizumi could not send his own combat force to guard them.

On Monday Howard received another heavyweight call in his Auckland room, from British Prime Minister Tony Blair, reinforcing Koizumi's request.

Washington has long been urging Canberra to increase its forces on the ground. And on January 29, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw phoned Australian counterpart Alexander Downer with a formal request.

According to Howard and Downer, the request was greeted without enthusiasm. Australia has insisted it would not increase the size of its force in Iraq, a position Howard says did not change until urgent meetings in Canberra on Tuesday.

"It was only right towards the end that we, as a group of ministers, and then the [Cabinet's] national security committee, came to the view that we should make this contribution," he said.

The decision to send an extra 450 troops and 40 light-armoured vehicles to Iraq was a bombshell. It took the Army by surprise and launched a desperate scramble to raid other units to equip and deploy a company of infantry and a cavalry squadron from the Darwin-based 1st Brigade within 10 weeks.

Politically, it was dynamite, reversing a string of assurances Howard had given Australia and re-opening a fiery debate on Australia's presence in Iraq and the strength of the ties binding Canberra to the United States.

The concept of Diggers defending Japanese soldiers raised hackles among those with bitter memories of World War II. It also renewed criticism of the Army's inability to fight high-intensity battles: without the new US Abrams heavy tanks, not due for another two years, much of Iraq is still too dangerous for Australian troops.

Interestingly, New Zealand emerged as better-equipped for the insurgency. Said Australian Defence Association executive director Neil James: "The reason we haven't sent a larger ground force is because we're not equipped enough.

"Your LAV3 [armoured cars] could survive in the Sunni triangle as long as they were adequately backed up by American tanks and attack helicopters. In our LAV2s it would be a bit risky."

Australia's new troops will be based in the relative backwater of Al Muthanna, where casualties can't be ruled out, but which has seen less violence than elsewhere.

Al Muthanna is a thinly populated province of about 350,000, mainly Shi'ite, people, running southeast from the Euphrates River to the border with Saudi Arabia. The local tribes had no love for ousted dictator Saddam Hussein. Some joined the ill-fated rebellion against the regime after the first Gulf War.

Since July 2003, when the first of 1400 marines and support troops arrived under the United Nations mandate to rebuild Iraq, the province has been under the effective control of the Dutch. Their major role has been to keep order and to protect the Japanese military engineers providing water and power.

The deployment has been divisive. The Netherlands opposed the invasion and only reluctantly joined the UN-sanctioned stabilisation force. The initial eight-month commitment was extended until next month, but despite pressure from Washington, London, and from within its ruling coalition, the Government late last year announced its troops would leave by early March.

Though it is described as one of the most peaceful provinces, two Dutch soldiers were killed in Al Muthanna, others were wounded in ambushes, and mortar attacks were launched against their base in the provincial capital As Samawah. Dutch troops killed at least 12 Iraqis.

The Japanese have also come under fire a number of times and threats have been made against civilians working for them. Tribal leaders have also complained bitterly that Japanese projects have failed to meet local expectations.

The Dutch withdrawal triggered the pressure that led to Howard's backflip. The British had agreed to put 600 troops into the region but needed help, the Japanese insisted someone should protect them, and the US could not spare the soldiers.

"Ever since the Dutch signalled they were going to withdraw, there has been an increasingly desperate search to find someone to replace them," James said. "It is a real job. Someone had to do it. We were the option of last resort and the option of last resort was exercised."

Many Australians disagree with James, viewing the new deployment as symbolic only and another demonstration of Canberra's subservience to Washington. "Will it affect the strategic situation in Iraq? No," said Michael McKinley, of the Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. "The Americans are not so much calling in their markers. They're just throwing their weight around."

Howard insists the US had nothing to do with the decision, which was made in response only to direct approaches from Britain and Japan.

He listed three main reasons for agreeing to send more troops: following the recent elections, Iraq was at a "tilting point", with real hope of democratic freedom on one hand and a disastrous collapse to insurgency on the other; the need to support Japan in Iraq and as a regional security partner; and the need to train Iraqis to provide their own security.

Again, opinion is split. McKinley sees the linkage to the Pacific alliance with the US and Japan as rhetoric, demonstrating Australia's desperation to show it is on-side with Washington.

James disagrees: "We haven't just done this because of Iraq. We've done this just as much for our strategic purposes in the Asia-Pacific region. It wouldn't be a good time to have any tension in the Japan-US relationship, and a Japanese withdrawal from Iraq would risk that."

James also rejects as foolish claims that Australia is heading into a quagmire: "Critics don't understand the meaning of exit strategy. Quite clearly there's an exit strategy for the entire Coalition effort in Iraq, and that is to establish a freely elected and hopefully democratic government, which takes over security so everyone can leave. The only argument is how long it will take."

McKinley sums up the counter-argument of critics, who also point to the queue of other nations leaving Iraq: "Part of the Australian commitment will be involved in training the new Iraqi security forces. That is a long-term commitment. The Americans have admitted they're not up to the task and when you end up trying to manage civil strife, it's difficult.

"It is different from Vietnam, but what is not significantly different is that once you provide an ongoing commitment it becomes a justification for remaining. You end up justifying your current and future plans on the basis of a poorly conceived initial commitment."

In the middle is the Army. The practical problems of rapidly pulling together an overseas deployment and keeping it in the field were shown in East Timor and the Solomons. The Army will need to strip other units to pull the force together in time.

But it will cost up to A$300 million ($324 million) a year under initial estimates, knocking a hole in a budget already squeezed by pressing defence plans and burdened by the Government's election promises.

And while Timor and other big overseas deployments have not greatly affected recruitment or retention of troops, the strain is being felt.

Operations such as Iraq place heavy demands on a relatively small number of crucial skills needed to keep combat forces in the field, from intelligence to transport, food and fuel, and the workload helps to push key personnel into higher-paying civilian jobs. Even so, James said, the Army would manage. "It'll be a stretch, not a strain," he said.