Max Hastings is tickled by the irony that Alan Turing, the brilliant mathematician codebreaker at Bletchley Park during World War II, has emerged as a celebrated secret warrior, when until recently he was virtually unknown outside his professional circles. Yet this is appropriate. This was the conflict when signals intelligence
Book review: The Secret War, Max Hastings
Subscribe to listen
Author Max Hastings. Photo / Supplied
By contrast the Germans were poor. All their agents in Britain and the United States were captured. However, their aptitude for signals intelligence remained considerable. It gave General Rommel temporary ascendancy in north Africa. And it often bamboozled Bletchley Park, which, for all its successes, experienced an alarming nine-month gap in its coverage of the war at sea in 1942.
The Germans complicated matters by using different equipment and settings. The output from their Lorenz Schlusselzusatz teleprinter was much more difficult to crack than their fabled Enigma cipher machine. This allowed an unsung hero, Bill Tutte, another young Cambridge mathematician, to emerge. He painstakingly modelled the Lorenz SD, so its product could be read.
Tutte is one of a fascinating cast conjured up by Hastings, including Ronald Seth, an unhinged British agent who worked with the Germans, and Richard Sorge, a successful Soviet spy who infiltrated the German embassy in Tokyo. Equally interesting is Hiroshi Oshima, the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, who was treated to many confidences by the German High Command, and who fed them back to Tokyo, but not before they were read by the Americans who had broken the Japanese diplomatic code.
While dismissive of SIS personnel (apart from the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, who knew more about Hitler's inner circle than anyone, even in Germany), Hastings has more time for the Special Operations Executive, the irregular force charged by Churchill to "set Europe ablaze" through acts of sabotage and support for popular resistance.
The SOE's activities allow Hastings to expand on a principle - the importance of hard power on land, at sea and in the air if a combatant is to exploit any secret knowledge. Thus the British knew where the Axis intended to strike in Crete, north Africa and Malaya, but this did not stop them losing subsequent battles. In south-east Asia, they suffered too from America's efforts to prevent them resuming any post-war imperialist role. The tensions, as well as the close collaboration, in the Anglo-American intelligence relationship form an integral part of the story.
Hastings never holds back on his opinions. He is clear that, by 1945, the Soviet Union, with its firmness of political purpose and its eye to future opportunities, had gained the most from its wartime intelligence activities. The supremacy of electronic surveillance of communications had also been established, leading to the modern cyber-warfare highlighted by the revelations of WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden.

Hastings concludes that while much intelligence gathering is wasteful and expensive, the tiny fraction that is not often proves so vital that the rest is indubitably worth the effort.
The Secret War
by Max Hastings
(William Collins $39.99)
- Canvas, Telegraph