Seoul can take credit for setting up the talks between Pyongyang and Washington. South Korean officials travelled to Pyongyang in early March and returned with word that Kim had expressed a willingness to talk about giving up his nuclear weapons with Moon and Trump, something that seemed unthinkable just months ago.
But it's unclear how much more South Korea can control the process. Seoul's ambitions took a hit when Kim made a surprise visit to Beijing recently for a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. That summit reintroduced China as a major player in the push to resolve the nuclear stand-off and almost certainly strengthened Kim's leverage heading into talks with Moon and Trump.
Analysts say Kim would have asked China, North Korea's only major ally and economic lifeline, to soften its enforcement of sanctions aimed at the North. Kim also may have sought Chinese commitments to strongly oppose any military measure the US might take should his talks with Trump fall apart and the North start testing missiles again.
The Kim-Xi summit exposed South Korea's delicate role as an intermediary between Washington and Pyongyang and raised further questions over Seoul's claims that Kim has shown genuine interest in dealing away his nukes.
North Korea has been talking about the denuclearisation of the peninsula since the 1980s, but that offer has been linked to a demand that US troops leave South Korea, and that Washington halt its dispatches of nuclear-capable assets to the region during war games and guarantee that it won't use nukes against the North. Kim has always justified his nuclear weapons development as a defence against the "hostile policies" of the United States and its allies.
Moon said on Thursday that Kim isn't asking for the removal of US troops but still wants security guarantees and for the US to end its "hostile" policy.
It won't be clear until the summits occur what North Korea intends, but its closeness to China strongly indicates its traditional stance remains. Beijing has called for a "dual suspension" - of the North's nuclear and missile activities and of the large-scale military exercises between the US and South Korea.
Who's in the driver's seat?
At the meeting in Panmunjom, the Koreas may agree on measures to reduce tension across their heavily-armed border and regular communication on a new hotline between their leaders. They may also agree on cultural and sports exchanges.
But for South Korea, the meeting is mostly about keeping alive a positive atmosphere for the Kim-Trump talks. This means Moon must persuade Kim to approve a vision of denuclearisation that's closer to what Seoul and Washington have in mind.
Moon has been calling for a process where North Korea first declares its commitment to denuclearisation and a permanent peace regime on the peninsula in exchange for the allies promising a security guarantee. The North would then enter a phased process that begins with a freeze of its nuclear weapons and missiles and ends with their complete removal. Washington and Seoul would then set up a robust verification mechanism and gradually lift sanctions and carry out the promised security measures based on Pyongyang's fulfilment of its obligations.
Things could break down if Kim demands bigger concessions up front or asks for separate negotiations and rewards for completing each step. North Korea has always balked at allowing outside inspectors into its facilities.
Sunrise or sunset
Moon has vowed to build on the legacies of late liberal presidents Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun and their so-called "Sunshine Policy", which Moon had a hand in building. Seoul's economic inducements resulted in two summits with the North and a temporary rapprochement in the 2000s.
Moon says the decade of hardline conservative policies he ended when elected last year did nothing to stop Pyongyang's weapons advancements.
He has balanced his criticism of the North's nuclear programme with hints of ambitious economic promises in exchange for denuclearisation. Moon's proposals have included reconnecting an inter-Korean railway and building a gas pipeline connecting the Koreas with Russia.
But Moon is in a significantly tougher spot than his liberal predecessors, who governed when the North's nuclear threat was nascent. It's becoming harder to get South Koreans excited about engaging a nuclear North Korea when there's no longer strong public interest in reunification. This means that Moon can't reward North Korea with big economic projects without also seeing the results of a verified denuclearisation.
- AP
