Dialogue: Labour foreign policy lacks focus in Pacific, East Asia

By TERENCE O'BRIEN*

Nearly six months after the general election, there is a clearer impression of the foreign policy issues that the Government wishes to pursue, but less clarity about the strategic relationships - aside from Australia - that it wants to consolidate.

Human rights, nuclear disarmament, free trade and environmental issues, not surprisingly, preoccupy attention. But, with the exception of human rights, Government initiatives seem to represent largely the continuation, or revival, of the policies of its predecessor.

The sharper focus on human rights in foreign policy must meet the challenge of even-handedness and of pitching the advocacy so that it does not simply provoke resentment.

Here, the evidence of the Prime Minister's visit to Turkey suggests pragmatism is the watchword. Human rights advocacy was framed as part of a constructive effort to extend New Zealand's relationship with Turkey. Such pragmatism, however, will be tested in other more challenging foreign policy circumstances, notably the relationship with China.

The pragmatic approach should, as well, be sustained with Indonesia, where a distinction can be legitimately drawn between human rights abuse and the troublesome path to democracy that challenges Indonesia's political and social cohesion.

The democratic purists might conclude that a measure of political destabilisation in Indonesia is a reasonable price to pay for genuine democratisation. But that is hardly a realistic foundation for foreign policy towards Indonesia.

Versions of democracy, and of capitalism, in today's world differ. History teaches that democracy takes time to mature. In France, women received the vote 150 years after the 1789 Revolution that enshrined the rights of man; in the United States, the vote for black Americans in the southern states was only fully secured 170 years after independence; and citizenship for Aboriginals in Australia was granted after much the same post-settlement lapse of time.

In comparison, New Zealand's record is better and that should reinforce a discerning approach. Indonesia gained independence barely 50 years ago, and the legacy from its colonial past was, to say the least, an indifferent one. More time is needed for it to transform politically.

The Foreign Minister has adroitly sought to nourish New Zealand's relationship with Indonesia while maintaining our position on issues of principle. Australia should value this effort, given that restoration of its own admittedly more substantive and complex relationship with Indonesia is likely to demand much perseverance. New Zealand's distinctive contributions in Bougainville and in East Timor likewise provide evidence of diplomatic capacity in difficult times.

But more will be called for, including in the Pacific Islands, where the Foreign Affairs Ministry foresees "a huge number of new problems." Certainly, Fiji and the Solomon Islands bear out that forecast. Appropriate resources in both foreign and defence policy will be at a premium for the longer haul.

Over the first six months, it has been harder, however, to discern a pattern of strategic relationship-building in foreign relations. The spread of prime ministerial visits to Chile, Turkey, Britain and Singapore is evidence of an eclectic attempt to strike out in newer directions, or return to older ones.

Clearly, the centre-left connection is considered relevant by the Government in a world grappling with the upside and downside of globalisation. It believes New Zealand has things to learn from the connection, but foreign relations consist of more than sharing economic policy thinking. Relations with Western Europe (which is dominated by the centre-left) will, in practice, still likely be dominated by trade-economic issues.

The main gap in a notional strategic foreign policy blueprint is the Pacific and East Asia. The ongoing exploration of amalgamation between CER and the Asean Free Trade Area (Afta) is politically significant in these turbulent times in South-east Asia, even if the process is complex and the results may take time.

But much of the engine power for free trade area policy inside Wellington, now and earlier, comes from trade policy officials, while the strategic foreign policy intentions at the political level are less clear. And this extends wider than Asia.

What are, for example, the strategic ramifications of a preferential trade area with the United States, which the Government, like its predecessor, supports, although it is an idea borne mainly of official-level activism?

There has been little formal public expression either of our thinking about North-east Asia, where several live issues such as Taiwan and the reunification of the Koreas will figure in upcoming visits to the region by the Foreign Minister.

This visit will oblige New Zealand to consider such issues within a coherent foreign policy framework. A scheduled prime ministerial speech on foreign policy tomrrow in Wellington, the first of Helen Clark's tenure, may help to outline that framework.

The issues in North-east Asia go, of course, much wider than trade. The region offers probably the major test of the balance between values-driven (human rights) and interests-driven (political and economic) foreign policy.

New Zealand's judgments and discernment about the major political-security issues, and the way it positions itself to contribute to peaceful management of problems, will affect all its relationships in that strategically vital region, including with the US.

A relationship of friend but not ally seems to be the Government's preferred strategic choice. If so, that will, in itself, require active and imaginative diplomacy.

* Terence O'Brien is a teaching fellow in international relations at Victoria University.