Three senior Royal New Zealand Navy officers, including the commanding officer, have been charged over the loss of HMNZS Manawanui after the ship struck a reef off Samoa.
The charges have been laid under the Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971, alleging errors on the bridge on the evening of October 5, 2024, led to the vessel grounding on a known navigational hazard southwest of Tafitoala village on Upolu Island.
Commander Yvonne Gray, Lieutenant Commander Matthew Gajzago and a third officer will face court-martial over the sinking of the ship.
Pleas have not yet been entered over the allegations, although Gray has indicated via her lawyer that she will defend the charges.
The charging documents include the allegation that the third person, the officer of the watch at the time, was guilty of “negligently causing a ship to be lost”.
The charge sheet alleges that officer turned Manawanui towards a reef that lay about half a nautical mile ahead, about 6.13pm local time, while travelling at more than four knots.
That officer is also accused of failing to disengage autopilot and take manual control in time to prevent the grounding.
Gajzago, who was the command supervisor on the bridge, has been charged with “negligently permitting a ship to be lost”. It is alleged he failed to properly supervise the third officer and ensure the ship avoided the reef.
Gray faces two alternate charges relating to the moment the ship approached the hazard.
One alleges she negligently permitted the ship to be lost, by being absent from the bridge while within a nautical mile of a known reef. The alternate charge, which could be pursued instead, alleges she failed to attend her place of duty on the bridge in those circumstances.
Gray also faces a separate charge alleging she failed to ensure an appropriate plan was in place to manage the risks of conducting hydrographic survey work in uncharted waters close to reefs south of Upolu.
The charges were certified for trial and laid earlier today.
Todd Simmonds, KC, who is acting for the ship’s commander, said Gray had “endured a lot of unjustified criticism” over the sinking of the Manawanui.
He said Gray firmly denies the charges and will welcome the opportunity to respond to them at a court-martial.
Lawyer Matthew Hague, who is acting for Gajzago, said there are questions that needed to be answered about the decision to bring the court-martial proceedings and believed there were “fundamental flaws” in the process.
Senior officers further up in the chain of command had duties connected to the Manawanui’s ability to go to sea around the time of the sinking and later were in positions where they could have had decision-making power around prosecution, Hague claimed.
“There is an old saying that you shouldn’t be allowed to mark your own homework”.
There would be close examination in the charging process, and whether it was ethically and legally “untenable”, Hague told the Herald.
Hague said the public needed to have confidence in the fairness of the trial, including clearly understanding what role senior Navy officers who weren’t charged had in the process of preparing the Manawanui for its final and ill-fated mission.
A Court of Inquiry into the loss of the ship delivered its final report on March 31, 2025.
The inquiry report said the ship’s survey activity had not been properly “signed off” through the Navy’s seaworthiness release system, a process that takes place on shore and above the ship’s commander.
The Court of Inquiry found the ship was carrying out surveying “without having completed the required seaworthiness review process”.
The crew ran a “partial virtual sea day” on September 26, 2024, after which it was assessed as “safe” overall, and the waiver excusing it from full seaworthiness trials was approved the following day.
A minute on September 27 recommended the MCC note and accept the “safe” recommendation.
The court found the Navy’s own preparation and sign-off system failed to ensure the ship was properly ready for the task.
It was critical of advice to senior command, saying survey planning and risk assessment, and advice provided to the Maritime Component Commander, had been inadequate.
The inquiry criticised both the ship’s level of preparedness and the Navy’s shore-based system for approving and readying ships for missions. It found that failures in the Navy’s planning and sign-off processes ashore played a significant part in what happened.
It also found that some crew members were carrying out key roles without having completed the required training or formal sign-offs for those jobs. In some cases, personnel had not finished the necessary courses or received confirmation they were qualified to perform the duties they were assigned.
The Manawanui, a specialist hydrographic and diving support ship, had been operating in Samoan waters when it grounded on October 5.
All 75 crew and passengers were evacuated. The ship later capsized and was lost.
In the days that followed, attention focused on environmental risks from fuel and debris, salvage operations, and the diplomatic implications of a New Zealand warship lost on a Pacific neighbour’s reef system.