Such a characterisation of US regional policy is deeply misleading. Given the risks of great power “hot war” with China which would involve nuclear weapons, no US administration – including Trump‘s – would act as recklessly on such serious military issues as Clark and de Jong appear to suggest.
Indeed, the US continues to perform an invaluable role in our region’s security by balancing Chinese assertiveness and in preventing war through deterrence. The simple fact is that it takes a great power to balance China’s military capabilities. And to be absolutely clear, it is China, not the US, that has been the first mover in a variety of disruptions to the regional status quo since 2008.
These have included the militarisation of the South China Sea; use of coercive diplomacy against Australia, Japan, the Philippines and South Korea; and pursuing a strategy of seeking military nodes and positions across Asia, most recently the South Pacific – a region of existential importance to New Zealand.
It is China and not the US that is undermining New Zealand’s security both in respect to missile testing in the Pacific Islands region in 2024, the recent developments in the Cook Islands, and military exercises in the Tasman Sea. The latter came with no advance warning – with Beijing choosing to conduct live-firing exercises directly under a major commercial airway between New Zealand and Australia.
We agree with Clark and de Jong that the Trump administration has taken a series of actions in its first 100 days that are injurious to the interests of the US, the region and the broader international system.
That said, as with any administration that overreaches, Trump’s foreign policy is already experiencing the corrective mechanisms of domestic and foreign policy blowback and balancing that will serve as powerful restraints moving forward.
As for New Zealand’s relationship with the US, contrary to Clark and de Jong’s portrayal, we are not practising “subservience”.
The coalition Government is making prudent adjustments in order to fortify New Zealand’s independent foreign policy. It is doing so because of a convergence of strategic interests with the US and its alliance and non-alliance partners, who seek to stabilise regional security.
We therefore advise a more measured perspective than the one offered by Clark and de Jong on both New Zealand policy toward the US, and in how we understand the US and its policy toward the Indo-Pacific region.
Second, concerns with Clark and de Jong’s analysis deepen when one considers their call for “an alternative vision of collective security based on climate action, sustainable development, and nuclear disarmament” and “investing in development and diplomacy”.
The point is this: New Zealand’s pursuit of these important goals is not incompatible with developing closer security ties with Australia and the US.
The key here again is one of balance. Clark and de Jong would have New Zealand narrowly pursue collective security, development, and diplomacy at the expense of investing in our own military, our alliance with Australia, and our close partnership with the US, which is our second largest export market.
The Australian-New Zealand alliance is the bedrock of our security. No serious analyst or official on either side of the Tasman challenges this reality. That is for good reason. A weakening of that relationship will have multiple severe consequences for both sides’ foreign and security policy.
And make no mistake – no responsible New Zealand government can sustain a “nothing to see here” policy if Australia’s security is seriously threatened. Yet, Clark and de Jong’s statement that “New Zealand’s geographical isolation supports a significant degree of strategic independence”, and claim that “our best strategy is independence” is historically inaccurate, a departure from longstanding New Zealand policy, and raises serious questions about the value they invest in the Australian-New Zealand alliance.
A New Zealand without the alliance will truly be subservient – to the realities of coercive diplomacy so prevalent in contemporary world politics.
As we move forward in the current turbulent and far from benign security environment, we need more clear-eyed and vigorous discussions on foreign and security policy.