Displaced Palestinians move southwards in the central Gaza Strip on September 20. Photo / Eyad Baba, AFP
United States President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said they had agreed to a 20-point peace plan that could end the war in Gaza and release the hostages.
But some of its most contentious demands cross red lines that Israel has previously warned it would not agree to.
Here are the key points and how they could begin to unravel.
1) Gaza will be a deradicalised, terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbours.
Along with recovering the hostages, ridding Gaza of terrorists is the Israeli key war aim.
As for deradicalisation, Netanyahu made it clear that Israel has little faith in the Palestinian Authority – which is ultimately destined to take control of Gaza under the plan – to deradicalise the population, with measures such as changing the school curriculum.
However, he expressed confidence in the Trump plan and the transitional authority, was worth a try.
2) Gaza will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza, who have suffered more than enough.
A vague point but important given that the first time Trump and Netanyahu stood together in the White House this year the President suggested displacing the population and redeveloping the Strip into a rich man’s paradise.
3) If both sides agree to this proposal, the war will immediately end. Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed upon line to prepare for a hostage release. During this time, all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal.
Withdrawal lines have been sticking points in previous negotiations.
However, those set out in the map released by the White House yesterday will presumably be tempting for Hamas to accept, as they would oblige the IDF to withdraw from Gaza City and other key strongholds, where Hamas is under heavy assault.
4) Within 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting this agreement, all hostages, alive and deceased, will be returned.
This reflects the changed thinking in Israeli and US corridors of power since the previous round of negotiations broke down in July.
Namely, that a further programme of staged hostage releases simply would not fly.
Steve Witkoff, Trump’s diplomatic envoy, tried to reheat the January-February ceasefire deal many times, after all, without success.
5) Once all hostages are released, Israel will release 250 life-sentence prisoners plus 1700 Gazans who were detained after October 7, 2023, including all women and children detained in that context. For every Israeli hostage whose remains are released, Israel will release the remains of 15 deceased Gazans.
Although it is a large number already, Hamas could delay a deal by arguing for more.
Ultimately, however, there will not be a deal without this, painful as it is to the Israelis to release killers.
6) Once all hostages are returned, Hamas members who commit to peaceful co-existence and to decommission their weapons will be given amnesty. Members of Hamas who wish to leave Gaza will be provided safe passage to receiving countries.
Netanyahu previously offered exile to Hamas members, saying in March that “Hamas leaders will be allowed to leave Gaza”.
But his promise was made in relation to Trump’s plan for “voluntary migration” of Gazans and Israel has killed all but one of Hamas’s senior leadership in Gaza.
7) Upon acceptance of this agreement, full aid will be immediately sent into the Gaza Strip. At a minimum, aid quantities will be consistent with what was included in the January 19, 2025, agreement regarding humanitarian aid, including rehabilitation of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage), rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads.
8) Entry of distribution and aid in the Gaza Strip will proceed without interference from the two parties through the United Nations and its agencies, and the Red Crescent, in addition to other international institutions not associated in any manner with either party. Opening the Rafah crossing in both directions will be subject to the same mechanism implemented under the January 19, 2025, agreement.
Israel will have to allow aid to enter the Strip, as the rest of the plan will be largely pointless if the people of Gaza continue to go hungry.
Whatever they sign up to, Israel knows that it will retain control over the inflow of aid and can impose restrictions at the Jordanian and Egyptian borders, or entry points to Gaza.
However, the plan does not suggest which countries will be in charge of the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure.
9) Gaza will be governed under the temporary, transitional governance of a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee, responsible for delivering the day-to-day running of public services and municipalities for the people in Gaza. This committee will be made up of qualified Palestinians and international experts, with oversight and supervision by a new international transitional body, the “Board of Peace”, which will be headed and chaired by President Donald J Trump, with other members and heads of State to be announced, including former Prime Minister Tony Blair. This body will set the framework and handle the funding for the redevelopment of Gaza until such time as the Palestinian Authority has completed its reform programme, as outlined in various proposals, including President Trump’s peace plan in 2020 and the Saudi-French proposal, and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza. This body will call on best international standards to create modern and efficient governance that serves the people of Gaza and is conducive to attracting investment.
This is arguably the bitterest pill Netanyahu has to swallow – the long-term potential of Palestinian Authority control of the Strip, however vague.
Trump acknowledged that in the press conference. But this, it seems, a price the Arab partners demanded, and it is one Trump was determined that he paid.
At one time, the idea of Gaza being run by the President along with Tony Blair might have been mistaken as a particularly bad joke but we are in a new reality.
Indeed, it is Trump’s direct oversight of the post-war transition process – stopping Israel dragging its heels on military withdrawal – that may be a key factor securing Arab and indeed Hamas support.
10) A Trump economic development plan to rebuild and energise Gaza will be created by convening a panel of experts who have helped birth some of the thriving modern miracle cities in the Middle East. Many thoughtful investment proposals and exciting development ideas have been crafted by well-meaning international groups and will be considered to synthesise the security and governance frameworks to attract and facilitate these investments that will create jobs, opportunity, and hope for future Gaza.
11) A special economic zone will be established with preferred tariff and access rates to be negotiated with participating countries.
It wouldn’t be a Trump plan if there wasn’t strong economic incentives.
The list of countries waiting to donate billions of pounds to reconstruct Gaza is long, making this point the least contentious. Arab Gulf nations such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia have already pledged to donate, while European nations will do the same.
Trading is trickier as Israel will probably insist on controlling all goods entering Gaza until it is sure that Hamas is no longer active in the enclave but it will be considered in Israel’s interests, by its moderates, to see Gaza prosper economically once a transitional government manages to uproot Hamas and take full control of the Strip.
12) No one will be forced to leave Gaza, and those who wish to leave will be free to do so and free to return. We will encourage people to stay and offer them the opportunity to build a better Gaza.
It is almost as if Trump’s February “Middle East Riviera” press conference, which enthralled the Israelis, never happened. By contrast, now offering Gazans who have left the enclave the right to return will likely be met with fierce opposition from some in Netanyahu’s Government.
Indeed, elements in Israel had already begun planning where the first Jewish settlements would be situated in Gaza. What role the United Nations will play in helping run the post-war Gazan society is an open question.
Israel detests UNRWA, which has acted as a proxy civil service for decades, but a handful of whose members took part in October 7. Trump also labelled them “corrupt”.
As for the Palestinians who want to leave Gaza, the most important question remains unanswered: which countries will take them in?
13) Hamas and other factions agree to not have any role in the governance of Gaza, directly, indirectly, or in any form. All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt. There will be a process of demilitarisation of Gaza under the supervision of independent monitors, which will include placing weapons permanently beyond use through an agreed process of decommissioning, and supported by an internationally funded buy back and reintegration programme all verified by the independent monitors. New Gaza will be fully committed to building a prosperous economy and to peaceful co-existence with their neighbours.
This is the technical grist on the pathway to peace. The independent monitors are key here, as otherwise Israel could be tempted – perhaps under pressure from the ultra-nationalist coalition members – to slow the process by unilaterally deciding that a certain district or area has not demilitarised.
However, it is still likely that Israel will retain a certain amount of control with this process. It is ultimately their security at stake, after all.
14) A guarantee will be provided by regional partners to ensure that Hamas, and the factions, comply with their obligations and that New Gaza poses no threat to its neighbours or its people.
15) The United States will work with Arab and international partners to develop a temporary International Stabilisation Force (ISF) to immediately deploy in Gaza. The ISF will train and provide support to vetted Palestinian police forces in Gaza and will consult with Jordan and Egypt who have extensive experience in this field. This force will be the long-term internal security solution. The ISF will work with Israel and Egypt to help secure border areas, along with newly trained Palestinian police forces. It is critical to prevent munitions from entering Gaza and to facilitate the rapid and secure flow of goods to rebuild and revitalise Gaza. A deconfliction mechanism will be agreed upon by the parties.
A deconfliction mechanism will be agreed upon by the parties. This will be one of the more difficult elements for Netanyahu to sell at home.
What started with the October 7 massacre, ending with, potentially, Arab boots on the ground in Israel’s back yard will not go down well with everyone.
However, it does mean that the exhausted IDF does not have to remain in Gaza permanently, a big relief to both the young men and women of Israel, who are called to serve on the front line, and its commanders.
No process of deradicalisation and demilitarisation is ever entirely successful, so the strength of this new policing model will be crucial. A lot will be determined by the long-term commitment of outside nations to make it work.
16) Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza. As the ISF establishes control and stability, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) will withdraw based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarisation that will be agreed upon between the IDF, ISF, the guarantors, and the United States, with the objective of a secure Gaza that no longer poses a threat to Israel, Egypt, or its citizens. Practically, the IDF will progressively hand over the Gaza territory it occupies to the ISF according to an agreement they will make with the transitional authority until they are withdrawn completely from Gaza, save for a security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat.
The dreams of Netanyahu’s coalition partners are explicitly dashed here. But it could be a long process.
It is not impossible that this collapses the governing, prompting elections where alterations to the deal could be on the agenda.
But it gives Netanyahu an easy way out of a major headache that would see Israel in violation of international law while being responsible for the lives of two million Palestinians.
An occupation of Gaza would cost Israel billions of pounds every month to sustain, while putting enormous pressure on an already exhausted army.
Israel will insist on being the one deciding when to declare “terror-free” areas. But there are question marks over the timeframe for handing over responsibility to the international force and whether the force is ready to fight Hamas if it resurfaces in the “terror-free zone”.
On the plus side, from Israel’s point of view, the IDF will keep the security perimeter it claimed since October 7.
17) In the event Hamas delays or rejects this proposal, the above, including the scaled-up aid operation, will proceed in the terror-free areas handed over from the IDF to the ISF.
This denies local Hamas leaders of derailing the whole process. However, the prospect of disarmament, deradicalisation and IDF withdrawal taking place successfully in one area while fighting continues in another seems hard to contemplate.
Gaza is not a large area, after all. But this clause illustrates the commitment of the White House to drive the process forward.
18) An interfaith dialogue process will be established based on the values of tolerance and peaceful co-existence to try and change mindsets and narratives of Palestinians and Israelis by emphasising the benefits that can be derived from peace.
Who could argue with this? Except perhaps the Israelis and the Palestinians, the former still deeply wounded from October 7, the latter having endured what they see as a genocide.
19) While Gaza re-development advances and when the PA reform programme is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which we recognise as the aspiration of the Palestinian people.
This almost directly reflects the language the Saudi Arabia et al have spoken for years as their price for recognising Israel. It is a huge coup for the Palestinian Authority (even if they aren’t named in this particular clause). And a huge blow for Netanyahu, who has built his career on preventing Palestinian statehood. However, a “credible pathway” is a long way from a state.
20) The United States will establish a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians to agree on a political horizon for peaceful and prosperous co-existence.
This is extremely vague and, it could be argued, covered off by previous more concrete points.
But a laudable aim, nonetheless, particularly after the polarisation of the last two years.
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