Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (left) has just days to consider a 28-point peace plan put together by the administration of US President Donald Trump. Photo / Getty Images
The US has presented its 28-point peace plan to the Ukrainians and reportedly warned it has until Thursday to accept or it will cut off supplies of intelligence.
The deal, shaped by chief negotiator Steve Witkoff in conjunction with Russia’s Kirill Dmitriev, makes several demands that cross Ukraine’s red lines.
It is not quite as damaging to Kyiv’s interests as a draft leaked earlier this week, and there are elements that it will welcome, including on the size of its army and lack of limits on its arsenal.
But overall, the pattern leans in Moscow’s favour – and would require Ukraine to make concessions for which it has so far shown little appetite.
Ultimate acceptance will hinge on how bad Kyiv assesses the situation on the battlefield to be. If it is in real danger of collapse, as some think, it may swallow a close version of the deal. If not, it won’t.
Here are the 28 points Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy must consider, and an analysis of which country they favour:
Russian President Vladimir Putin has long denied Ukraine’s right to exist. Simply confirming it does, and is its own sovereign nation, may not amount to much in practice, but it puts down a subtle marker that Russia will have to accept it cannot achieve its most “maximalist” war goals.
Then again, Putin promised to respect Ukraine’s independence in the 2000s and invaded anyway. Words mean little.
All ambiguities of the past 30 years will be considered settled.
In short, let’s all move on. No more wars and no more complaining by Moscow about the rights of Russian speakers in Ukrainian regions. The most obvious ambiguity involves the status of Crimea, which will presumably be resolved in Russia’s favour.
The 30-year timeframe appears to refer to the Budapest memorandum, when Kyiv was last given security guarantees (the less said about these, the better) in exchange for handing over its nuclear weapons.
Again, Russia has shown how seriously its promises of “non-aggression” can be taken. So such a deal makes little difference.
Moscow will be pleased its illegal invasions are placed side by side with the expansion of Nato – the Kremlin has long claimed its wars are motivated by the growth of the alliance.
Realistically, Ukraine has little to no chance of joining Nato. But this would prevent others in the queue, such as Moldova, from membership (Moldova’s Prime Minister just won an election on a platform of resisting Russia and joining the bloc).
So, an enormous victory for Russia’s strategic goals that will be resisted in European capitals.
A dialogue will resolve all security issues and create conditions for de-escalation in order to ensure global security and increase opportunities for co-operation and future economic development.
The key words here are “future economic development”. US President Donald Trump has long touted a spate of deals with Russia, such as over Arctic mining and rare earths, once the war is over. Such deals will be hard to strike above a cacophony of security complaints from Nato members.
It is not clear how the US, a member of Nato, will act as a mediator in negotiations. Perhaps it reveals something of how the Trump administration currently views its role in the alliance.
A lot rests on the word “reliable” – and no specifics are offered in the rest of the deal.
This plan does not include extreme restrictions on the Ukrainian military that were touted in a draft leaked by the Russian negotiating team earlier this week. It is also welcome that the US will contribute to the guarantees (albeit in exchange for compensation).
But without a specific definition of what such support will entail, the guarantees are likely to lack credibility in Moscow’s eyes.
At the 2022 talks in Istanbul, Ukraine requested a peacetime army size of 250,000 (the same number it began the war with). Moscow proposed 85,000. A standing army of 600,000 (down from the current 900,000) would provide sufficient force to protect Ukraine, presumably buttressed by programmes to ensure mobilisation can happen quickly and efficiently.
Moreover, there are no demands in the deal for Ukraine to relinquish its long-range weapons – contradicting the earlier Russian draft.
Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join Nato, and Nato agrees to include in its statutes a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.
It has long been largely accepted in the diplomatic community that, unless Russia is forced to accept defeat, Ukraine will not be allowed to join Nato. With the prospect of a Russian collapse far from imminent, this mostly reflects the status quo – albeit in line with Russia’s war goals.
Britain and France have proposed stationing thousands of troops in Western Ukraine, protecting key infrastructure behind an initial layer of Ukrainian forces.
Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov slapped down the proposal months ago. There were doubts anyway within the so-called “coalition of the willing” about the ability – and willingness – of Western militaries to permanently rotate through Ukraine. But this will meet a Russian demand, and leaves open the question of what Western “security guarantees” will actually look like.
Poland already has a capable air force, undergoing rapid modernisation. But this point – presumably added to counteract the concession on Nato troops in Ukraine – suggests Ukraine’s allies will deploy large amounts of air power on the border, able to switch into action in the event of any Russian aggression.
However, the word “European” indicates the US will not station its own jets in Poland – a blow to Ukraine. Facing down a European air force is quite different to taking on one that includes American pilots.
The US will receive compensation for the guarantee.
If Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose the guarantee.
If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a decisive co-ordinated military response, all global sanctions will be reinstated, recognition of the new territory and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked.
If Ukraine launches a missile at Moscow or St Petersburg without cause, the security guarantee will be deemed invalid.
So America will be paid for underpinning the security agreement that could end a devastating war – but such is to be expected from the Trump administration. Moscow a snapback of all sanctions and a “decisive” Western military response if it invades again, as many expect.
Whether under Trump the US would be prepared, in practice, to help deliver a “decisive” reply is unclear. Washington will not station jets on Ukraine’s border and is in the process of withdrawing some soldiers from Europe. What aid, realistically, could the US then give in a crisis?
It is a far cry from the guarantee that helped end the Korean War, which included the deployment of about 250,000 US soldiers in South Korea.
Until and unless those questions are answered, it is difficult to see how this goes beyond the vague – and ultimately useless – guarantees of the 1994 Budapest memorandum. Nevertheless, Ukraine will be pleased at the suggestion it might be able to use its long-range weapons to hit cities that are not named Moscow or St Petersburg.
Ukraine will receive short-term preferential access to the European market while this issue is being considered.
Putin has long accepted Ukraine joining the EU, so this largely formalises the status quo. The country’s entry into the union poses sizeable challenges to Brussels, of which the Russian leader is surely aware.
a. The creation of a Ukraine Development Fund to invest in fast-growing industries, including technology, data centres, and artificial intelligence.
b. The United States will co-operate with Ukraine to jointly rebuild, develop, modernise, and operate Ukraine’s gas infrastructure, including pipelines and storage facilities.
c. Joint efforts to rehabilitate war-affected areas for the restoration, reconstruction and modernisation of cities and residential areas.
d. Infrastructure development.
e. Extraction of minerals and natural resources.
f. The World Bank will develop a special financing package to accelerate these efforts.
In essence, Washington and US companies will have a large part to play in a bonanza of reconstruction efforts – and the profits that potentially accrue from them.
Kyiv may be glad of American support in mining and its gas industry, but the devil will be in the detail: previous draft agreements have seen onerous terms imposed on the host country, while the benefits flow across the Pacific.
a. The lifting of sanctions will be discussed and agreed upon in stages and on a case-by-case basis.
b. The United States will enter into a long-term economic co-operation agreement for mutual development in the areas of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centres, rare earth metal extraction projects in the Arctic, and other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities.
c. Russia will be invited to rejoin the G8.
At the Alaska summit, Trump hoped the lure of economic co-operation with the US and re-entry into the global economy would be enough to convince Russia to lay down arms. That proved to be incorrect.
But while he repudiates the West, Putin does set some stock in Moscow being treated as a great power – and would welcome a return to the top table of the G7 (it will be hard for the other members to swallow, given the attendant photo-ops and handshakes).
From Ukraine’s perspective, the removal of sanctions in stages is preferable to a sudden, wholesale lift. In theory, that encourages Russia to comply with other elements of the deal that may not be quite to its liking.
But the Russians get to go back to business as usual, as if nothing had happened. This is a big win for Putin, absolving him of even symbolic punishment for launching the biggest war in Europe since Hitler.
Some US$100 billion ($180b) in frozen Russian assets will be invested in US-led efforts to rebuild and invest in Ukraine. The US will receive 50% of the profits from this venture. Europe will add US$100b to increase the amount of investment available for Ukraine’s reconstruction. Frozen European funds will be unfrozen. The remainder of the frozen Russian funds will be invested in a separate US-Russian investment vehicle that will implement joint projects in specific areas. This fund will be aimed at strengthening relations and increasing common interests to create a strong incentive not to return to conflict.
The most novel element of the plan – and among the most controversial. As things stand, Europe is on the verge of seizing €140b ($290b) of frozen Russian assets and using them to support Ukraine for the coming years. Only Belgium of the 27 member states is a hold-out, at this stage, and it was expected to relent in the coming months.
But here, Trump puts his hand right in the pie. Much of the frozen funds, it envisions, will be spent not on Ukrainian defence but on US-led reconstruction efforts – from which Washington will profit. Given Russia is likely to lose the funds on the current trajectory, the ability to “invest” them with the US – and presumably recoup some profit – becomes a preferable alternative.
Any European move to seize the funds will now be painted as undermining Trump’s peace plan. If this deal ends the war, Ukraine can celebrate the fact that Russian money is being spent on its reconstruction. If it does not, the provision seriously complicates Europe’s next steps in raising funds for its ally.
A working group on security issues will be established to promote and ensure compliance with all provisions of this agreement.
Any deal that allows Russia to put its point of view to the Americans without the involvement of Europe or Ukraine is concerning for the latter’s security.
Moscow already has a law imposing up to 15 years in prison for planning, preparing for or fighting an “aggressive war”. Under Putin, any such legislation is not worth the paper it is written upon.
The United States and Russia will agree to extend the validity of treaties on the non-proliferation and control of nuclear weapons, including the Start I Treaty.
The Start 1 treaty limiting strategic nuclear weapons expired in 2009, so perhaps this is a typo. The US and Russia have signalled they are ready to extend its replacement, the New Start treaty, which expires early next year.
The clause is in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Zelenskyy has at times provocatively suggested only nuclear weapons would be sufficient to protect Ukraine if it is not allowed to join Nato. The West will never supply them. Nor could Kyiv construct a viable nuclear weapon, even in secret, in the current security environment. As such, this is a concession that does not cost too much.
The plant will be launched under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the electricity produced will be distributed equally between Russia and Ukraine – 50:50.
Russian forces currently hold the nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhya but its reactors have long been in cold shutdown.
Operating the plant requires Western and American equipment, and four of the six reactors need fuel made by Westinghouse, a US-nuclear company, to run – having been switched away from Russian supplies before the war.
Putin may be willing to hand control to the Americans, rather than Ukraine. For Kyiv, getting some power from the plant is better than nothing – although it will be galling to see supplies heading east to Moscow.
Both countries undertake to implement educational programmes in schools and society aimed at promoting understanding and tolerance of different cultures and eliminating racism and prejudice:
a. Ukraine will adopt EU rules on religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities.
b. Both countries will agree to abolish all discriminatory measures and guarantee the rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and education.
c. All Nazi ideology and activities must be rejected and prohibited.
An endorsement of Russia’s war goals. Ukraine will have to reverse some of the steps it has taken since the beginning of the war to eradicate the Russian language and lessen the influence of its culture.
The reference to “Nazi ideology” comes straight out of the Kremlin copybook. Although it is unclear what this could mean in practice, it could have consequences for military units with roots in the far-right, such as the Azov (which has gone some way to distance itself from that past).
a. Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk will be recognised as de facto Russian, including by the United States.
b. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, which will mean de facto recognition along the line of contact.
c. Russia will relinquish other agreed territories it controls outside the five regions.
d. Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk Oblast they currently control, and this withdrawal zone will be considered a neutral demilitarised buffer zone, internationally recognised as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarised zone.
A major concession for Ukraine. By withdrawing from the parts of Donetsk it currently controls, it will give the so-called fortress belt that prevents a Russian thrust west.
There are some additions to sweeten the pill. The establishment of a demilitarised zone (DMZ) would make it harder to use the territory as a staging ground for a renewed invasion (but Moscow’s “little green men” have previously made a mockery of such DMZs in Ukraine).
Washington believes Ukraine will lose this land eventually in any case and is pressing for acceptance of the terms as a way to avoid the accompanying bloodshed.
In terms of the other territorial deals, the phrase “de facto” may smooth the path to an agreement. Ukraine will not be forced to give up its claim, “de jure”, on the land. But the US will recognise Crimea and the occupied territories as Russian, in practical terms. In theory, a future Ukrainian administration could seek to reclaim its legal right to the conceded lands.
But simply putting “de facto” in writing gives it some “de jure” weight. The West never granted the Soviet Union any such recognition over its 40-year occupation of the Baltic states, for example. America’s proposals give Russia a piece of paper to cement its own claim, should the matter be reassessed in the decades ahead.
Any security guarantees will not apply in the event of a breach of this commitment.
Given the security guarantees largely apply to Ukraine, this primarily serves as a warning not to attempt to snip back any portions of land conceded to Russia.
Russia will not prevent Ukraine from using the Dnieper River for commercial activities, and agreements will be reached on the free transport of grain across the Black Sea.
Welcome, but Russia has previously agreed to these demands, then broken its word.
a. All remaining prisoners and bodies will be exchanged on an “all for all” basis.
b. All civilian detainees and hostages will be returned, including children.
c. A family reunification programme will be implemented.
d. Measures will be taken to alleviate the suffering of the victims of the conflict.
The return of the thousands of children kidnapped into Russia would be a victory for Ukraine, not to mention the families split up by Moscow’s cruel programme of exfiltration. Melania Trump has publicly raised the plight of these children – and her influence may have ensured the formal inclusion of the provision.
Moscow has previously called for Ukraine to hold an election before it agrees to any peace deal. The thinking being, it could influence the vote to ensure a more pliable regime is elected, which would then strike a peace deal more favourable to Russia.
Kyiv would never hold an election in the middle of a war, so the demand was always a non-starter. But this timeframe suits Ukraine more than its enemy. Despite the corruption scandal he is currently engulfed in – and the difficult terms of this deal – it is not impossible that Zelenskyy would win any vote. That would enrage Putin, who started the war in part to unseat him.
All parties agree not to make any claims or consider any complaints in the future.
A controversial clause. Russia could not be forced to pay for reparations, as with Nazi Germany, in future. In reality, the Kremlin would never agree to such terms without a complete military defeat, which is not currently in the offing.
Ukraine’s Defence Minister Rusten Umerov denied he changed the draft to include “all parties”, thereby granting amnesty to Ukrainian officials involved in corruption. But most extraordinarily, this wipes the slate clean for the war criminals – the perpetrators of the Bucha massacre, the bombing of the Mariupol drama theatre, the execution and torture of prisoners of war, and other atrocities.
One might argue bringing those people to justice is unlikely anyway – but to simply absolve them of responsibility, 80 years after the Nuremberg trials, makes a mockery of “never again”.
This agreement will be legally binding. Sanctions will be imposed for violations.
Like the Gaza peace plan, Trump promises to chair a board monitoring implementation of the deal. This is a difficult, time-consuming job – and Russia has years of experience in manipulating international observers of ceasefires (see the OCSE mission that followed the Minsk agreements).
Once all parties agree to this memorandum, the ceasefire will take effect immediately after both sides retreat to agreed points to begin implementation of the agreement.
Russia would have to retreat to, presumably, behind the DMZ in Donetsk. A slight bonus for Ukraine.
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