Assassinated Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in 2024 in Tehran, Iran. Photo / Getty Images
Iranian clerics are choosing a new leader, determining whether the Islamic Republic seeks de-escalation or pursues suicidal confrontation with the United States and Israel.
According to reports, the leading contender to take power in Iran is the son of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
However, several favourites to lead the country have emerged out of the rubble of the air strikes that killed the Supreme Leader, on Saturday.
Many of the previous candidates were killed on the opening day of the war.
“It’s not going to be anybody that we were thinking of because they are all dead,” admitted US President Donald Trump.
Here are the leading contenders vying for power in the wake of the Ayatollah’s killing.
Likely strategy: Ceasefire
The path towards de-escalation runs through Alireza Arafi, the 67-year-old cleric selected to join the temporary council.
Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian Foreign Minister, told his Omani counterpart that Iran was “open to any serious efforts” to stop escalation – the first diplomatic signal that Tehran might seek an off-ramp from war.
If clerics select Arafi as Supreme Leader, it would signal willingness to return to that diplomatic framework.
Arafi controls Iran’s seminaries and religious education infrastructure, giving him clerical credentials.
His controversial 2023 trip to Moscow, during which he met Russian officials and talked about Iran’s desire for “extensive co-operation with Russia”, suggests he has backing from the Kremlin.
But Arafi’s selection would probably mean he serves as a figurehead, while the real power resides with the Larijani family.
Ali Larijani, an adviser, diplomat and scholar, whom Khamanei trusted more than anyone, has long been assigned to safeguard the Iranian regime in the event its leadership was wiped out.
In this scenario, Arafi would provide religious legitimacy while the Larijani brothers, Ali and Sadeq, both key members of the inner circle, would exercise actual control, using Omani mediation to negotiate a ceasefire that preserves the regime’s core interests – ending strikes, maintaining some nuclear capability, avoiding regime change.
Russia would guarantee the agreement. The US would accept limited Iranian nuclear enrichment in exchange for verified constraints preventing weapons development.
There are some obstacles: hardliners who view negotiation as betrayal, commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) who want revenge for dead colleagues, and clerics who issued fatwas declaring revenge for Khamenei’s death.
Likely strategy: Suicidal escalation
Mohammad Mehdi Mirbagheri is a 66-year-old cleric whose apocalyptic theology and absolutist politics represent Iran’s most radical ideological current.
Mirbagheri said on television that “to reach the goal of divine proximity, even if half the world’s people are killed, it is worth it. Therefore, the killing of 42,000 people in Gaza does not matter compared to that great goal”.
This logic – that tens of thousands of deaths are acceptable costs for theological objectives – would also be likely to be applied to domestic and foreign policy.
If clerics select Mirbagheri, it would signal rejection of any negotiated settlement and commitment to total war regardless of consequences.
He views the Islamic Republic as part of “God’s grand plan” and conflict between “believers and infidels” as inevitable.
His ideal governance model is “maximalist velayat-e faqih” that comprehensively directs all aspects of society towards “establishing monotheism” without being limited by geographic borders.
In this scenario, Iran would continue “Operation True Promise 4” with sustained attacks on US bases across the region, Israeli cities, and Gulf states hosting American forces.
As Supreme Leader, Mirbagheri would order continued strikes on aircraft carriers, oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and UAE, and keep the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of global oil passes, closed.
The US would respond with overwhelming force, potentially including strikes on Iran’s remaining government infrastructure, cities, imposition of complete economic blockade, and support for regime change operations.
This scenario would end in Iran’s destruction – but Mirbagheri’s theology frames martyrdom as victory.
“The progress model must do many things so that women observe hijab and not just rely on persuasion,” he has said, suggesting his vision of governance extends beyond mere survival to comprehensive ideological transformation.
If the Islamic Republic cannot achieve that transformation, according to Mirbagheri, destruction becomes an acceptable outcome.
Likely strategy: Pragmatic survival
The path towards managed succession runs through Sadeq Larijani, the 64-year-old head of the Expediency Council whose brother Ali has spent years positioning him as the candidate who can maintain consensus across factions during crises.
Sadeq Larijani served as judiciary chief during the brutal 2009 Green Movement crackdown, establishing hardline credentials.
But he also occasionally criticised corruption – although considered corrupt himself – and endorsed limited legal reforms, creating just enough moderate credibility to be palatable across factions.
More importantly, he has avoided the polarising controversies that damaged other candidates – no televised statements about acceptable death tolls, no threats to raise flags in Baku, no suspicious Moscow trips suggesting foreign backing.
In this scenario, the Assembly of Experts selects Sadeq Larijani directly rather than elevating Arafi as figurehead.
This signals prioritisation of institutional continuity over ideological purity.
Sadeq would pursue Khamenei’s policies without Khamenei’s charisma – maintaining confrontation with the West while avoiding suicidal escalation, preserving the nuclear programme while exploring diplomatic constraints, suppressing dissent while allowing limited economic reform.
The Larijani family’s decades of network building, strategic marriages into clerical establishment and careful positioning across key institutions would translate into a governing coalition.
Ali Larijani continues running crisis management as national security council secretary. Sadeq Larijani chairs the expediency council that approves major decisions. The family’s allies staff critical positions throughout the system.
This scenario is the Islamic Republic’s best chance of survival – not through victory but through outlasting America’s attention span, exploiting divisions among regional states, and demonstrating enough restraint to avoid triggering regime change operations while maintaining enough confrontation to satisfy hardliners.
Likely strategy: Military coup, installed as IRGC puppet – if alive
A possible military dictatorship could seize power through Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader’s second son, who has operated in the shadows for years as his father’s unofficial deputy and potential successor.
If he survived the strikes and the Assembly of Experts fractures over succession – with the clerics unable to agree on Arafi, Mirbagheri, Sadeq Larijani or other candidates – the IRGC could simply impose Mojtaba through military force.
As Khamenei’s son, he carries dynastic legitimacy. As someone who has managed his father’s office and networks for years, he understands the system’s mechanics. As a figure acceptable to IRGC commanders who want revenge for dead colleagues, he provides military backing.
In this scenario, Iran becomes an explicit military dictatorship rather than a theocracy with military characteristics.
The pretence of clerical rule continues, but actual power stays with IRGC commanders who elevate Mojtaba as a figurehead while making decisions through military councils.
The temporary leadership council becomes permanent with rotating military commanders replacing civilian officials.
Iran pursues what IRGC commanders describe as “powerful blows to the tired military body of the enemy” while consolidating domestic control through intensified repression.
Another possible outcome that could play out is that an IRGC military coup led by Mojtaba Khamenei triggers something all previous scenarios sought to avoid: civil war and separatist movements exploiting central government weakness.
Kurdish areas in north-west Iran, long seeking autonomy, would probably declare independence or intensify armed resistance if they perceived the central government collapsing into military dictatorship.
Arab populations in Khuzestan province, which contains much of Iran’s oil infrastructure, have historical grievances and could launch separatist movements.
Baluch militants in south-eastern Iran near the Pakistani border have conducted attacks for years and would exploit chaos to expand operations.
Iran fragments into competing zones of control – IRGC-dominated Persian core around Tehran, Kurdish autonomous regions in north-west, Arab-majority areas in the south-west, Baluch territories in the south-east.
The Islamic Republic that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini built survives as a rump state controlling perhaps half its former territory while prosecuting multiple counterinsurgency campaigns.
When Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989, the Assembly of Experts selected Ali Khamenei within hours despite his lack of required religious credentials, demonstrating the system’s ability to adapt constitutional requirements to political necessities.
The same flexibility could elevate unexpected candidates – perhaps a figure not currently being discussed, someone emerging from the IRGC or from quietist clerics in Qom who have avoided politics until crisis demands engagement.
State TV has also been prominently showing Hasan Khomeini, Khomeini’s grandson, since Saturday – potentially sending a message.
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