The Washington Post reported harrowing accounts of people who were caught without warning and tried to escape as the Palisades Fire ripped through the brush-covered hillsides around their homes, forcing police to demand that drivers flee their cars and run toward the ocean so they would not burn. When the powerful, dry winds shifted that January afternoon, the blaze swept from the outskirts straight through town, incinerating banks, grocery stores, gas stations, and street after street packed with homes and cars.
The blaze that would eventually be known as the Palisades Fire had started nearly a week before, on New Year’s Day, authorities said. Firefighters quickly suppressed what was known then as the Lachman Fire, but unbeknown to them, it endured, burning roots and dense vegetation below.
Heavy winds caused the subterranean fire to re-emerge, the start of a weeks-long campaign of death and destruction, according to authorities.
Back in January, The Post reported that a fire on New Year’s Day had probably reignited to spark the Palisades Fire, based on an analysis of photos, videos, satellite imagery and radio communications, as well as interviews with witnesses. Firefighters told The Post that they had properly mopped up the January 1 fire, but despite later warnings of an intense and dangerous wind event, a Los Angeles Fire Department spokesman told The Post at the time that it was not the department’s practice to maintain patrols of past fire sites, even for a few days after fires have gone cold.
Shortly after midnight on January 1, firefighters responded to the Lachman Fire, northeast of the Pacific Palisades neighbourhood. It initially covered 1.2 to 1.6ha of heavy brush and had a slow rate of spread. Winds were relatively light, and helicopters were able to make water drops. Four camp crews were dispatched, and firefighters were in place to defend at least one home.
Still, with almost ideal conditions, it took about four hours to contain the blaze. At 4.46am, the Los Angeles Fire Department reported that the fire was contained and that mop-up operations would continue “to ensure no flare-ups”.
A 3.2ha fire is sizable, fire experts said, and it’s hard to ensure that fires are completely cold. That often requires firefighters to go over the area by hand, which is difficult for fire departments that are often understaffed and responding to many incidents and emergencies.
From Colorado to California to Hawaii, flare-ups of previous fires, known as reignition, have been the cause of some of the nation’s most catastrophic and deadly wildfires. This past summer, California officials coordinated a social media campaign to warn residents that scorched terrain, where flames are seemingly extinguished, can spawn deadly new fires for weeks after the old ones appear to have gone out, as fire can smoulder almost undetected underground or inside wood.
An external review commissioned by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors determined that “outdated policies, inconsistent practices and communications vulnerabilities” hampered officials’ efforts to warn and evacuate residents during the January fires. The independent report called for changes to prevent similar breakdowns from happening again.
“While frontline responders acted decisively and, in many cases, heroically, in the face of extraordinary conditions, the events underscored the need for clearer policies, stronger training, integrated tools, and improved public communication,” according to the report.
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