Little serendipity in island's paradoxical peace process

The court ruling ending Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga's 11-year rule and ushering in fresh presidential elections by the end of the year has set the calendar back on restarting stalled peace talks between the Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

But Kumaratunga's exit in December is expected to breathe new life into a peace process that broke down during her presidency under pressure from hardline political groups opposed to negotiations with the rebels.

The hope is that her successor will be a moderate, willing to engage the Tigers and work towards ending a conflict that has claimed more than 60,000 lives in the island nation since 1983.

But the route to peace promises to be anything but smooth. Political parties in Colombo are locked in a power struggle that has fostered political instability. The Supreme Court verdict late last month resulted from Kumaratunga's bid to hang on to the presidency beyond her statutory term.

She was elected to her first six-year term as President in August 1994 and won a second six-year term following an early election in late 1999. Kumaratunga argued she had an extra year to her credit, carried over from her first term in office.

The court disagreed.

Under Sri Lanka's Constitution, she cannot run for a third term.

Her Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP), which won parliamentary elections in 2004, lost its majority in Parliament after its ally, the Sinhala nationalist People's Liberation Front, or JVP, walked out in protest after the President signed an agreement with the Tamil Tigers over tsunami aid.

Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse, a moderate, has been named as Kumaratunga's successor and will run against the opposition United National Party (UNP)'s Ranil Wickramasinghe, a former premier whose government was sacked by Kumaratunga in 2004 for granting too many concessions to the Tamil Tigers.

Wickramasinghe's peace initiatives resulted in a 2002 truce with the rebels. His concessions include granting greater autonomy to minority Tamils.

Contrast this with the view expressed by Athuraliye Rathna, a member of the opposition party which took Kumaratunga to court: "There was big political instability in the country. Now we have a chance to gain some stability and fight against the murderous terrorists."

The LTTE evokes strong feelings across Sri Lanka's political landscape.

Though voters are gripped by election fatigue (elections were held in 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2004), there appears to be a consensus in favour of the upcoming poll.

Sri Lanka's financial markets and businesses, groaning under the slow pace of Kumaratunga's economic reform, perked up at news of the court ruling. The Colombo stock market index rose by 1.5 per cent.

But foreign investor sentiment was more cautious.

A joint report by the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank puts Sri Lanka among the world's most unstable countries despite the 2002 ceasefire, and notes it had three different governments in just four years. But Sri Lankans are upbeat about yet another election.

How it impacts on the peace process will depend on the political mix. Kumaratunga's ruling SLFP is divided over allying with the JVP, which has advertised its opposition to negotiations with the Tigers.

Wickramasinghe's UNP, though "soft" on the rebels, may find itself beleaguered in its push for peace.

Whoever wins the presidency will come under pressure, both domestic and international, to move the peace process forward.

Yet a single handshake to commemorate a token concession to the Tamil minority could invite bitter opposition from the Sinhala majority.

This is the paradox that bedevils the peace process in Sri Lanka.

And if the President sits at one end of the political divide, the Prime Minister is likely to be subject to partisan scrutiny. During her lengthy tenure in office, Kumaratunga demonstrated the perils of Sri Lanka's presidential system of government.

The 2002 ceasefire came under strain following the assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar on August 12. Kumaratunga clamped a state of emergency. The Government blamed the LTTE for the killing. The rebels denied the charge and demanded the lifting of the emergency as a precondition for talks.

Sri Lanka's peace broker Norway offered to host a face-to-face meeting between the Government and the rebels to review the truce.

The venue remains undecided.

Each side is accusing the other of breaching the ceasefire. The Tigers allege that the Sri Lankan military has been providing support to a breakaway rebel faction active in Tiger territory.

The Government has a long list of LTTE infringements.

The LTTE withdrew its participation in April 2003 after five inconclusive rounds of talks with the Government.

Still, the fragile ceasefire has held longer than any in the past. A big boost for peace has been a shift in the rebels' long-term objective. Until the ceasefire was declared, the Tigers had been fighting for a separate state for Tamils in Sri Lanka's north and east. As talks progressed, the Tigers dropped their demand for an independent state and settled instead for regional autonomy.

The LTTE is increasingly mindful of international pressure. It claims to have stopped the practice of recruiting underage children into its ranks.

The military and the rebels both recognise they are caught up in a war neither side can win. The next few months are crucial for Sri Lanka. Only a president elected for a six-year term with a fresh mandate can revitalise the peace process.