Editorial: Ugly truths of war belong in public hands

Opinion

Secrecy has always been part and parcel of warfare. Only long after the event have people learned the reality and details of a conflict. Even as recently as the time of the Falklands War, Britons had no real idea how closely their country sailed to catastrophe.

This secrecy is warranted when it comes to the minutiae of military operations. But when a war is the subject of as much controversy as that in Afghanistan, the more information that is in the public domain, the better.

Only with such openness can people form an accurate impression of the course and conduct of a conflict and whether it is winnable. WikiLeaks' disclosure of more than 91,000 once-secret United States military documents is a, broadly, welcome contribution to this.

The ease with which secrets can be leaked on the internet and the reach of that technology bring their own dangers. But in this instance, WikiLeaks has acted with a degree of responsibility.

About 15,000 records thought to include the names of Afghans or Pakistanis who helped US troops on the ground have been withheld. As a further safeguard, WikiLeaks went first to three major newspapers - the Guardian, the New York Times and Der Spiegel - for a reasoned analysis of the documents. But even this has not impressed the White House or the US military, which seem most intent on identifying the whistle-blower.

Their attention should be directed at what is revealed by the leaked material. These uncensored dispatches from the frontline deliver a disturbingly bleak picture of the war at a time when public support is waning. In particular, there is graphic detail of previously unacknowledged civilian deaths, some at the hands of undisciplined coalition troops. Information is also given on collusion between Pakistan's intelligence agency and the Taleban, as well as Afghans' lack of trust in the Kabul Government because of the high number of corrupt officials.

Most of this is not new. It merely confirms suspicions about the nature of the conflict. Some of it is also outdated because the documents, which start in early 2004, cover the period only until the end of last year.

The US has since developed a stronger relationship with Pakistan in the fight against the Taleban, and a new policy employed by General Stanley McChrystal, the commander in Afghanistan until last month, places a high priority on avoiding civilian casualties.

Some officers in the field have complained about the constraints of that policy since General McChrystal's dismissal for unwise comments to Rolling Stone magazine. These documents emphasise that if there is to be any chance of securing the Afghans' trust, the rule must not be eased.

Already, it may be too late. General McChrystal revealed the disarray in the American military and political ranks over the pursuit of the war.

The documents highlight the lack of coherence and comprehension on the ground. This has already led to questioning in the Senate foreign relations committee by former presidential candidate John Kerry, who, exasperated at the lack of progress, asked, "what's going on here?"

The content of these documents will prompt other Americans, as well as citizens of other nations with troops in Afghanistan, to ask the same question.

It would have been far more convenient for the White House and Pentagon if this material had remained concealed. But continued popular support for a conflict should be predicated on transparency, not a ragged recourse to patriotism or the like.

A case can still be made for pursuing the war along the lines introduced by General McChrystal. But now it must be made to a public fortified by a much better grasp of the realities of that struggle.