KEY POINTS:
President George W. Bush will be picking a number of fights if he decides, as expected, to greatly increase the number of United States troops in Iraq. Arrayed against him will be the Democrat-controlled Congress, itself a reflection of the American people's disillusionment with the conflict, a number
of notable figures in his own Republican Party and, not least, the Iraq militias his reinforced Army will have to face. The militias' growth in strength and confidence has mirrored the rise in sectarian violence.
Yet, in many ways, the President has given himself little choice if, as he maintained in his New Year's Day address, he wishes to "remain on the offensive against the enemies of freedom, advance the security of our country, and work towards a free and unified Iraq". Sending in another 30,000 to 50,000 troops, as part of a new strategy, would recognise that the number of soldiers on the ground has never been enough to impose America's will. The US secured an easy victory over Saddam Hussein's forces but thereafter badly underestimated the number of troops that would be necessary to establish stability, even in Baghdad. Into the vacuum have stepped Shiite and Sunni militias, which have rendered US military power and the rule of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's unity Government meaningless in large tracts of Iraq.
Those militias will have to be tamed, and in some cases destroyed, if that Government's military and police forces are to have any chance of imposing authority. A concentrated push by reinforced US troops, strongly backed by armour, is the only means of achieving that. The White House is impatient for this to occur. There are plans for a limited New Year offensive against Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army militia, which is widely blamed for sectarian death-squad killings. Already, British troops in Basra have been similarly involved, last week conducting armoured raids against groups they described as rogue Mehdi Army. Much more will be needed, however, and this can be pursued only by a more powerful presence.
This strategy is, of course, risky. There will be more American casualties and anguished resistance on the home front, and if executed poorly, it could result in few gains. It will also detract attention from the arguably more important conflict in Afghanistan. But, at the very least, it will gain time, during which much attention must be paid to the training of the inept, unreliable and ill-equipped Iraqi security forces. If the strategy fails, US policy will come to resemble Vietnamisation, with Iraq left to fend for itself as the Americans leave. In that event, the fracturing of the country along sectarian lines is the most likely outcome.
President Bush has other options. Most notably, these were supplied by the cross-party Iraq Study Group, which suggested the US should start withdrawing its troops and devote itself to training Iraqi forces, while beginning a diplomatic push, including Syria and Iran, to deal with the problems in Iraq and the region. Those recommendations are intertwined. The first part of the equation would amount to little more than Vietnamisation if diplomacy does not create a stable Iraq. Foolishly, the President has ruled out such negotiations.
That leaves him with only one option for achieving stability in Iraq - military force. President Bush's stubborn streak will probably lead him to announce that course over the next few days. It is a fraught strategy. The militias may, Hizbollah-like, prove resilient even in the face of the full force of American military might. But it is a final fling this President will be inclined to take. From it will emerge his legacy and the future of the state of Iraq.
