Editorial: Iraq's fate poised for final count

Opinion

Just over a thousand days after the United States-led invasion, a watershed has been reached in Iraq. The final result of Thursday's election may not be known for a fortnight but the democratic legislature promised to the Iraqi people is about to be realised. All the country's ethnic groups have participated in the election for a 275-seat Parliament that will hold power for the next four years. Iraq's future, and possibly its very existence, rests on the Government that emerges.

Under the scenario favoured by the US, there will be an Administration committed to national reconciliation and capable of winning the trust of the Sunni minority, thereby defusing the insurgency. Under another view, that Government will be a precursor to the country's disintegration.

For the first time, the Sunnis have cast their vote. This was their way of demanding, by whatever means, a say in Iraq's future. Their previous refusal to vote had locked them out of the debate on the country's new constitution. Yet if, as seems certain, Iraqis voted along ethnic and religious lines, the Sunnis might be doomed to disappointment. They have held the whip-hand for much of the country's history, but in a democratic poll, their five million-strong population pales beside the 15 to 16 million Shiite majority.

The Shiites, through the United Iraqi Alliance, had 140 seats in the 275-member transitional assembly, which was elected on January 30. Sunni participation this time will dilute that total, but the Shiite alliance is still expected to be the dominating force. If it shows no appetite for a more consensual Administration, the balance will tilt towards a clerical state, civil war and the eventual break-up of Iraq.

To prevent that outcome, the Bush Administration pushed the credentials of Iyad Allawi, a former Prime Minister, as a secular Shiite who could hold the country together. He appealed for the middle ground, urging Iraqis away from a vote based on religion. But he is tainted by association with the US, and in the January election finished a distant third behind coalitions representing the Shiites and the Kurds, the other main minority group.

At best, Mr Allawi could be a pivotal player in the horse-trading that precedes the formation of the new Government. Indeed, the best chance for a representative regime, which might win nationwide trust, could come if he were able to forge an alliance with parties representing the Kurds and the Sunnis, and again take the role of Prime Minister. That, however, would depend on Mr Allawi winning enough votes and the Kurds being willing to abandon their strategic alliance with the United Iraqi Alliance.

This must be counted as an outside prospect. Voting patterns will reflect the increased bitterness between the peoples of Iraq. The Sunnis accuse the Shiites of condoning militia death squads, and their Kurdish allies of grabbing land and oil in the north by intimidation. The Sunnis, in turn, are seen as being in cahoots with al Qaeda terrorists to regain the power they lost with the overthrowing of Saddam Hussein.

An ABC News poll, conducted in the lead-up to the election, found that two-thirds of Iraqis expected things to get better in their country in the coming months. But that degree of optimism tumbled to a third in the Sunni regions. The Sunnis, while willing to throw their lot in with the democratic process on this occasion, have little confidence that it will produce an inclusive Iraq.

A stable state and calmer times depend on that impression being proved wrong.