KEY POINTS:
WASHINGTON and BAGHDAD - Seen from the cratered, violence-drenched reality in Baghdad, the conclusions of the Iraq Study Group might appear as theoretical musings from a far-away land.
In the often unreal world of Washington politics, the bipartisan panel's report, delivered yesterday, is a metaphorical bombshell. It hugely
intensifies the pressure on an already weakened George W. Bush to change course on the issue that will define his presidency - or leave him more isolated than ever.
Bush was today to discuss the report with close ally British Prime Minister Tony Blair, after it called into question the Administration's entire Middle East policy: not just its failure in Iraq, but its attitude to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, its approach to the Lebanon/Syria crisis, and its relations with Iran.
The report recommended that he seek the help of Iran and Syria, significantly bolster Iraqi forces and prepare to withdraw most US troops within 14 months.
It warned that finding a way forward had to be part of a broader Middle East settlement that established a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and provided peace for Lebanon.
In a 100-page, bleak report that contained 79 separate recommendations, the ISG warned "the situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating" and that a regional conflict could be triggered if things continued to slide. It added: "There is no path that can guarantee success but the prospects can be improved."
Many of the report's recommendations had been leaked in advance and in some cases - for instance the deployment of US troops with Iraqi units - are already being carried out on the ground. Crucially, it may provide the political cover required by Bush to break from his refusal to alter strategy. Blair arrived in Washington intent on pressing the President to adopt the ISG's proposal of finding a regional solution. Bush said he would take "every proposal seriously and we will act in a timely fashion".
The report does not directly criticise the Government. But its recommendations can be read as both a clear rebuke of the Bush Administration's policies in Iraq and a rejection of its rhetoric about the extent to which events have slipped out of US control.
Whereas Bush pursued a policy of unilateralism, the report now recommends launching a "diplomatic offensive"; whereas Bush insists the US is "winning", the report makes it clear that attacks against US and Iraqi forces are "persistent and growing"; whereas Bush often speaks as though the US is the blameless bystander in the middle of a sectarian war the report makes it clear that "because events in Iraq have been set in motion by American decisions and actions, the US has both a national and moral interest in doing what it can to give Iraqis an opportunity to avert anarchy". It concludes that the current strategy "is not working".
It said there was significant under-reporting of the level of violence in Iraq and raised questions about the effectiveness of US intelligence saying the Government "still does not understand very well either the insurgency in Iraq or the role of the militias".
On the day the report was released, 10 US troops died in Iraq.
Ideas that sound sensible in Washington can founder in the harsh reality of Baghdad's streets. Proposals to hand power more quickly to Iraqi forces overlook the fact that few of those forces are battle-ready and that deep divisions remain among Iraq's leaders. And the ranks of Iraqi forces are heavily Shiite and infiltrated by Shiite militias. Furthermore, many US experts believe Iraqi forces won't be ready for combat for another three to five years. Troops on the ground echo that.
"They're not really skilled. They sit around and drink [tea] instead of going on their patrols. They're afraid to do what needs to be done," Specialist Diego Cabezas, 20, said of the Iraqi forces he works with in Ramadi. "Even if we do pull out, it's still going to be chaotic here. The Government isn't strong enough and the Army isn't ready to handle things on its own."
Iraqis remain dangerously divided on the road ahead. Over the past three years, Iraq's factions have appeared all but impervious to American timetables, either failing to meet them or meeting them in a way that sometimes made the situation worse.
Despite this, the ISG report is imbued with the belief of its co-chairman, former Secretary of State James Baker, that despite divisions, rivals and enemies can talk to each other. It is not a sign of weakness to talk to your adversaries, Baker said yesterday.
For Bush, the trickiest part of the report is that of dealing with regional diplomacy. Its calls for US troop withdrawals and beefed-up training of Iraqi security forces, with the underlying theme that Iraqis must take charge of their destiny, are shared by almost everyone.
The speedy direct engagement with Iran and Syria recommended by the panel is another matter. Thus far the President has steadfastly refused to so, linking dealings with Syria to its conduct in Lebanon, and insisting that before talks with Iran, the Tehran regime must suspend its uranium enrichment programme.
Baker gave short shrift to this approach, noting that, "We talked to the Soviets for 40 years, when they were trying to blow us up."
Instead the ISG suggests the nuclear confrontation with Iran should be dealt with at the United Nations.
Overall, the ISG's message is that time is running out - if it has not run out already.
This closely reasoned, withering critique has been delivered from the summit of the permanent Washington establishment, by a 10-member panel of the great and the good.
As a result, Bush will not be able to claim this is a conspiracy of his critics. But will he go the ISG route? That is the unanswerable question.
- INDEPENDENT, additional reporting: AGENCIES
