A view of destruction in the city of Kostiantynivka, Ukraine, on October 16. Photo / Getty Images
After four years, Ukraine, Europe, and possibly the United States, appear to be converging on seven critical and commonly accepted conditions for peace.
That’s key both to their own alliance, and to the possibility of negotiating a proper end to the war with Russia.
Many details may change, but the outline of an endgame is now taking shape. And it looks like this:
A ceasefire would freeze the front line before negotiations on territory swaps “starting from the line of contact”. There is no deadline for such swaps to take place, meaning talks could run indefinitely.
Although there is no international recognition or other stamp of legitimacy on Russia’s conquests, Ukraine pledges not to try to take back occupied territory by force. Russia makes a reciprocal undertaking.
What it is: The basis for a decades-long frozen conflict with the current frontline congealing into a de-facto frontier that in practical terms cements Russia’s conquests.
Think the Korean armistice line, the partition of Cyprus, or the existence of Transnistria.
What it is not: Russia’s stated territorial objective (the occupation of all of Donbas and further claims to Kherson and Zaporizhzhia).
Instead, Ukraine would keep the Donetsk region “fortress belt” towns of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk which protect the plain and the rest of unoccupied Ukraine beyond.
Nor is it Russia’s preferred sequence of talks preceding the ceasefire – which would allow the Kremlin to maintain military pressure on Kyiv to extract ever more punishing concessions.
Why it works: Keeping the fortress belt is a crucial difference which would make Russia coming back in future with a sweeping offensive towards Kyiv much harder.
Under the European-Ukrainian plan, Ukraine remains outside Nato as long as there is no consensus among existing members about letting it in – a long-established status quo that is likely to endure indefinitely.
America will provide a security guarantee that “mirrors Article Five” – the mutual defence clause that means an attack on one is an attack on all. Nato commits not to permanently deploy troops under its command to Ukraine in peacetime. Nato jets will be based in Poland.
What it is: The most solid possible security guarantee short of Nato membership.
An Article Five-style guarantee implies an American-led military response if Russia reinvades.
Foreign militaries – perhaps from France, Britain, or Germany – could deploy to Ukraine under national command on a rotational basis in peace time to reinforce the deterrent.
What it is not: Formal Nato membership – a Russian red line. But nor is it an empty, Budapest-memorandum style promise without the teeth to serve as a credible deterrent against Russian invasion.
Why it works: Proper security guarantees are the key element that make a land-for-peace territorial compromise acceptable to the Ukrainian public.
If Ukraine invades Russia, it will forfeit the security guarantee. If Russia restarts the war, sanctions relief, de-facto territorial recognition and any other benefits of the deal will be void, and it would risk war with the US.
What it is: A fail-safe clause that would punish anyone who restarts the war – and thus deter hawks on either side from doing so – and addressing both Ukrainian and Russian security concerns.
What it is not: Carte blanche for Russia to launch a third invasion or a blank cheque for Ukraine to try to reconquer its territory by force.
Why it works: The Kremlin has always claimed the war was one of self-defence. This mechanism uses Russia’s own words to enforce the peace.
Ukraine’s armed forces will be limited to 800,000 men “in peacetime”.
What it is: A Ukrainian Army almost as big as the one it currently fields.
What it is not: A crippling Versailles Treaty-style punishment that would leave Ukraine without a viable army and ban it from owning key weapons like long-range missiles (a previous Russian demand), making it defenceless against a third invasion.
Why it works: Since Ukraine would probably not need (nor afford) such a vast force in peace time, 800,000 provides ample head room. If war breaks out again, it could legally mobilise and expand rapidly.
Russia will be steadily reintegrated into the global economy. Sanctions relief would be phased and carried out on a case-by-case basis, with no deadline.
The US will enter into a long-term economic co-operation agreement with Moscow. Russia gets back into the G8.
What it is: Restoration of many, but not all, of Russia’s links to the globalised economy. A symbolic end to President Vladimir Putin’s international isolation.
What it is not: Blanket sanctions relief. Those imposed most recently, like October’s US sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil, would presumably be lifted first.
But others, like those linked to human rights abuses or the 2014 annexation of Crimea, might take longer – or remain in force indefinitely. There will likely be years of haggling over the details.
Why it works: Both sides profit. Sanctioned Russian officials and oligarchs get their frozen assets back and can once again travel to Western countries. Western firms return to lucrative Russian domestic markets.
The US will partner with Ukraine to restore its gas infrastructure and there will also be a “joint effort” to rebuild cities, infrastructure, and mineral resources. The World Bank will come up with a funding package.
What it is: US companies get to turn a profit on the long-awaited reconstruction bonanza in post-war Ukraine.
What it is not: An immediate return to Moscow of its US$250 billion of sovereign assets frozen in Europe, which will remain under lock and key until Russia pays reparations.
Why it works: The issue of reparations is likely to be highly contested, but as long as Russia does not get its money back there is considerable leverage to force it to pay at least some compensation for the vast damage it has inflicted on its neighbour.
All prisoners of war and bodies of fallen combatants will be returned home, as will civilians, including children.
What it is: Immediate relief for prisoners and families of the wounded and killed, and Russia sending home the children it “resettled” from occupied territories – a key Ukrainian demand.
What it is not: Immediate accountability. This would set aside the question of pursuing those responsible for murders, rapes and torture during the conflict.
It means Ukraine agreeing to postpone, for now, its demand to see Russians stand trial for, say, the Bucha massacre.
Why it works: It is a fudge that saves face. While speedy war crimes trials seem unlikely, this deal does not represent an amnesty for war criminals either.
That is because these new proposals scrap the clause in the initial 28-point Witkoff-Dmitriev plan absolving all individuals from crimes committed during the war.
These seven issues now define the parameters of an end to Europe’s biggest and bloodiest war since World War II.
The details will no doubt change, with each side wanting to mould them in their own interest.
But the substance is unavoidable, and the narrow ground on which to land a bitterly contested peace deal is now clear.
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