His official job involved managing the flow of information between institutions, coordinating diplomatic channels, suppressing factional infighting, and implementing controlled succession to prevent the system from fragmenting into competing power centres.
It was a role he honed during 30 years of building knowledge as culture minister, state broadcasting chief for 10 years, secretary of the supreme national security council, parliamentary speaker for 12 years, and, most recently, as Khamenei’s personal envoy to Vladimir Putin, the Russian President.
Last month, an Iranian official said: “He is officially running everything here.”
The question now becomes whether anyone else in Iran possesses the institutional knowledge, the trust, and the practical understanding of governance required to hold the system together.
The evidence suggests the answer is no.
He gave hardliners cover to make compromises
Iran’s Islamic Republic was designed as a complex system of overlapping institutions with deliberately competing power centres. It required constant coordination from the Supreme Leader’s office to function coherently.
The President runs the civilian Government but answers to the Supreme Leader. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps controls much of the economy and security apparatus but is theoretically subordinate to the Supreme Leader’s authority.
The Assembly of Experts selects the Supreme Leader but exists at his pleasure. The Guardian Council vets candidates for elected office based on criteria the Supreme Leader defines.
This structure was meant to prevent any single institution from accumulating enough power to challenge the Supreme Leader while ensuring that nothing could function without his coordination.
The system’s weakness is that it requires someone who understands all these moving parts and can make them work together.
Larijani’s intimate knowledge of this cannot be transferred quickly or easily replaced. He knew which clerics in Qom wielded real influence, versus those with impressive titles but little power.
He had spent decades building relationships with Russian officials, Chinese diplomats and regional powers. He knew how to structure negotiations to give hardliners cover for accepting compromises.
When Qassim Soleimani was killed in 2020, Iran replaced the leader of the elite Quds Force with Esmail Ghaani. When nuclear scientists are killed, new scientists can be trained.
But there is no mechanism for replacing the person who knows how to make the entire system work together, because that role was never formalised or even acknowledged.
The question facing Iran now is not whether individual institutions can survive – they can – but whether the system as a whole can function without the people who understood how to coordinate it.
Although Iran is more exposed than ever, the alleged killing of Larijani does not necessarily portend an end of the war. It has a new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, who has not been seen for weeks. But the assassination of Larijani leaves Iran without anyone to credibly negotiate with the US.
He was the only figure trusted by both Iranian hardliners and foreign governments to structure agreements. This may suit Israelis who want the Islamic Republic to fall, but those looking for a quick way out of a war that is triggering a global energy crisis may be disappointed.
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