ABs missing plan B

Richie McCaw. Photo / Getty Images

Ineffective decision-making has been a recurring World Cup nightmare, with some worrying signs in Brisbane that this old failing could re-surface. It's difficult to know whether the All Blacks' first half abomination was the result of inaccurate technical execution or a refusal to vary from a pre-determined tactical approach.

It's also difficult to know whether the vastly improved second half showing would have occurred without input from the coaching staff at half-time, or whether the senior players had already worked out the need to drive tight and relentlessly - and only shift the ball wider once the defence had been sucked into numerical disadvantage.

Assistant coach Steve Hansen reacted passionately to suggestions the players were unable to conclude for themselves they were pursuing the wrong tactics in the first half. His view was they simply played poorly; failed to start with the right mental application and as a result were second best at the collisions and unable to retain possession.

"Sometimes when you get put under the pressure they were put under, and clearly we weren't prepared for that mentally, and in my opinion we were five per cent off the pace. That's what the game is about and that's what we're trying to say the difference between Auckland and here was.

"So it's not about changing tactics, or not thinking about changing your tactics, it's about making sure you turn up mentally and you meet the challenge head on and then you look after the football because that's the thing you've got to get over the line to score tries with. If you don't have it, you spend a lot of time chasing the other blokes," he said.

The All Blacks kept possession expertly in the second half because they didn't take many risks. It was all pick and go - short passes, recycles and only the occasional offload. The mistakes dried up and they put the Australians under pressure by forcing them to commit to the breakdown which destabilised the rush defence.

We can only wonder why they didn't switch to a more direct, conservative strategy earlier in the game. Despite their obvious lack of cohesion, the All Blacks still managed to create two clear cut try-scoring opportunities in the first half.

Both were spectacularly blown not by poor decision-making but by poor handling. First Anthony Fainga'a was able to hit man and ball and a few minutes later Digby Ioane pulled off the same trick. On any other night the All Blacks would have scored - the passing would have been crisper, more accurate and the space exploited and no one would be fretting. Yet there is this worry that it took 40 minutes and for the score to reach 20-3 before there was any sign of Plan B. What worries most about that is how devoted the All Blacks are to a wide-wide game. It makes them a touch predictable and the Wallabies, having learned much from Eden Park, were able to bring their wings up quickly to close the space on the outside and leave the All Blacks firing blanks.

For all their talk of having learned from past mistakes, the All Blacks still seem to carry this notion of style being a bigger deal than substance. They give the perception of being reluctant to tone things down; that playing up the guts pick and drive football is some sort of failing on their part. It gives the impression that the All Blacks are not blessed with tactically astute footballers. They have incredible athletes, brilliant ball players, men with vision, timing and acceleration and they know high tempo, open space rugby better than anyone else. But how astute are they? How well do they read the game when it is not going as intended and how quickly and confidently do they adjust?

Richie McCaw is the world's most influential player. He is superb at dealing with referees, inspirational to his team-mates and exemplary in the way he trains and conducts himself. If there is one doubt, it lies in his ability to assess the big picture during the game. It's not that he can't impose or himself or is incapable of determining what the problems are; it is maybe more a case of him having too much belief in the abilities of those around him.

He has an unbreakable faith in the All Blacks' ability to climb out of trouble by playing pass and catch rugby. When the All Blacks get the basics right; when they dominate the collisions; go wide early; offload and support; they shred every team they play.

It is admirable that under pressure, McCaw can stay calm, deliver the message to believe in the game plan and urge better execution. In the last few years that patience and conviction has been invaluable - the All Blacks have won games they otherwise would have lost but for the strength of McCaw's leadership.

Yet, could it be true that McCaw lacks that sixth sense to know when there needs to be a more radical change of strategy? Should New Zealanders be thankful they got 40 minutes of effective rugby in Brisbane or concerned it wasn't 60? The optimists will point to the extenuating circumstances.

McCaw was not only subjected to a barrage of cheap shots from the Wallabies who were clearly trying to unsettle him and play him off the ball, he also had to contend with the double loss of Adam Thomson and Kieran Read.

His attention would understandably have been focused on the micro rather than the macro and it was a scramble enough trying to organise the loose trio into some kind of effective unit and keep his head attached to his neck. Maybe the conclusion to reach is that the All Blacks have become heavily reliant on the collective contribution of the preferred loose trio of the skipper, Jerome Kaino and Read.

Rugby is not so much a game of set pieces any more. It is won and lost at the breakdown more often than not and Kaino, Read and McCaw are a combination rated by Hansen as the best in the world. When those three are fit and firing, the All Blacks are more than likely to be on the front-foot and McCaw's captaincy at its best. With those two on the park, driving hard yards, making huge tackles and foraging for the ball, McCaw can play with his head up - see what is going on and have a much better feel for the game.

"They have shown enough over the last two years to warrant that billing [the best loose trio in world rugby]," says Hansen. "Individually they are all very good players but as a combination they complement each other particularly well. What happens at that breakdown comes down to the quality of ball you win and how quickly you get over the advantage line so you can go forward. Our loose forwards are going to have a big impact at the World Cup.." The All Blacks need Read back on the park; not just to get the team going forward with his ball carrying, but to allow the captain to be the tactical general he needs to be.