The democratisation of space has not only opened the door to innovation but also to vulnerability. The current legal frameworks may not be equipped to respond.
Over the past decade, the proliferation of commercial space ventures and the reduced costs of developing satellite technology have dramatically lowered the barriers to entry for “spacefaring”.
This shift has empowered not only governments but also private corporations and, alarmingly, non-state actors.
Groups and individuals once considered insignificant in the realm of space security are now capable of launching cyber attacks on satellites and ground stations.
In March 2022, Network Battalion (NB65), a group affiliated with Anonymous, allegedly hacked the Russian civilian space agency Roscosmos in protest of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The group claimed control over several satellites, prompting Roscosmos chief Dmitry Rogozin to declare that disabling another country’s satellites could be considered a “casus belli” – a cause for war.
While causing minimal damage, the incident underscores a broader trend: the increasing capability of non-state actors to disrupt space infrastructure. It also raises urgent questions about accountability, jurisdiction and the adequacy of international law.
Legal vacuum in the cosmos
International space law, anchored by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, was crafted in an era when only a handful of states had access to orbit.
The treaty emphasises peaceful exploration and co-operation, stating that activities in space must align with the UN Charter and promote international peace. However, it lacks explicit provisions addressing terrorism or the actions of non-state entities.
Article VI of the treaty does hold states responsible for national activities in space, whether conducted by government agencies or private entities. But it fails to define “non-governmental entities” or outline mechanisms for enforcement.
This ambiguity leaves a gaping hole in the legal architecture, especially as private companies increasingly take on roles once reserved for national space agencies.
The Liability Convention of 1972 offers some recourse for damage caused by space objects. But it too focuses on state actors and does not contemplate ideologically motivated attacks by rogue groups or individuals.
One of the most pressing challenges in addressing space terrorism is the lack of a coherent definition.
Traditional definitions of terrorism emphasise the intent to coerce a state into action or inaction through violence. But how does this translate to the orbital realm?
Some experts propose defining space terrorism as ideologically motivated destruction targeting the space industry. Their definition captures the economic dimension but omits the national security aspects unique to space.
Without a comprehensive definition, acts ranging from cyber intrusions to physical attacks on satellites risk being misclassified or overlooked entirely.
Historical precedents and emerging threats
Though under-reported, space terrorism is not a new phenomenon. In 1999, the UK’s Skynet military satellite was allegedly targeted by hackers demanding ransom.
While the Ministry of Defence remained tight-lipped, reports suggested communication channels were compromised, hinting at a sophisticated breach of national security.
More recently, Russia has been accused of persistently jamming UK satellites. This tactic disrupts communications and poses serious risks to both civilian and military operations.
These incidents have intensified concern that satellite attacks – whether through hacking, jamming or physical destruction – will become more frequent and sophisticated in the coming years.
As space systems become more integrated with Earth-based infrastructure, supporting everything from telecommunications to navigation, the stakes grow exponentially. Experts warn the next decade could see a surge in ideologically motivated attacks on satellites, with devastating consequences for global security and commerce.
The UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) has only recently begun to address space security threats. But without a dedicated legal framework, efforts remain fragmented.
One avenue would be to develop transparency and confidence-building measures to cultivate trust and co-operation among state and non-state actors. But data-sharing agreements remain difficult to negotiate because of national security concerns.
Future research must explore how UNOOSA can support states in crafting domestic laws that address space terrorism. This includes defining what constitutes an act of terrorism in space, establishing protocols for incident reporting and determining liability for attacks on commercial and civilian infrastructure.
Space terrorism is no longer a theoretical concern. It is a tangible threat with real-world implications. As the line between state and non-state actors blurs, and as private companies take on greater roles in space exploration, the need for a robust, adaptable legal framework becomes critical.
The question is no longer whether space terrorism occurs, but how the international community responds when it does. Without clear rules, accountability mechanisms and co-operative strategies, humanity risks turning the final frontier into the next battlefield.
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