Again, had the 2008 election been fought under SM, the Greens would have won just two supplementary seats, instead of the nine list seats they got under MMP.
If the threshold was kept at 5 per cent there would have been only three parties in Parliament - National, Labour and the Greens.
Opponents of SM view it as a FPP wolf in sheep's clothing. They see SM as destroying the diversity of an MMP Parliament, while reinforcing Cabinet power and ensuring Labour or National exercise that power unfettered by minor party partners.
That would not necessarily be the case. Japan has SM, but coalition governments almost always involving the conservative Liberal Democratic Party have been the norm.
Some of the alleged faults of SM - principally the lack of true proportionality - could be addressed with a different mix of electorate and supplementary seats. In East Timor, for example, 75 seats are proportionally elected and only 13 members are elected from constituency seats.
Japan's Parliament has 300 electorate MPs and 180 supplementary seat MPs. However, the act setting up the referendum and information produced by the Electoral Commission base their explanations on a 90:30 split of electorate and supplementary seats.
The public debate on the pros and cons of SM will accordingly be dictated by that ratio. SM tends to be favoured by those on the right of politics who want a return to FPP because they believe that produces more effective and decisive governments but think referendum voters will not support a return to the former system.
National's leaning towards SM may also spring from its relative lack of long-term minor party allies under MMP. By the same token, Labour's (understated) backing of MMP may reflect the relative ease that party has had in finding support partners with whom to form a government.
Such political factors may reduce the referendum to a battle between MMP and SM.