As for other US security partners, Australia spends 2 per cent, South Korea spends 2.6 per cent, Japan spends 1 per cent and New Zealand spends 1.2 per cent of GDP (the same as Germany).
The 2 per cent of GDP benchmark for member contributions to Nato's defence was an aspirational goal first raised during the Cold War and periodically reaffirmed thereafter.
In February, US Secretary of Defence James Mattis made the goal a requirement that extended to non-Nato US security partners.
That runs counter to the trend of the past decade where, other than in frontline democratic states such as Estonia, Poland and South Korea, military expenditures have fallen throughout the liberal democratic world, terrorism notwithstanding (which cannot be fought by conventional military means anyway).
In fact, the only regions that have seen increases in military spending over the past decade are the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia, all active conflict zones dominated by authoritarian regimes.
The truth is that most liberal democracies put the welfare of their subjects before war preparations, which means they largely spend relatively more on health, education and welfare than the US does.
The US, in turn, spends more on "defence" than most of its democratic counterparts and, in fact, most authoritarian states (China, for example, spends 1.9 per cent of GDP and 16 per cent of central government expenditures on "defence", while Russia spends 4.9 per cent and 15.9 per cent, respectively).
There is therefore nothing parasitic about the contributions to collective defence of most Nato members and other US security partners - they are simply paying the amount appropriate to their priorities.
The US wants to maintain its global military dominance in a world of rising new and old powers, so it spends more and wants those in its alliance networks to do likewise.
That does not mean that its military partners should automatically do so given their different domestic priorities and threat environments.
New Zealand needs to prepare for pressure from the Trump administration on the subject of security spending.
The Wellington and Washington bilateral agreements bind New Zealand to the US as a military ally in everything but name.
It is a first tier US intelligence partner given its membership in the "5 Eyes" signals intelligence collection alliance that includes Australia, Canada, the UK. It is a Nato associate.
It is therefore likely the US will demand New Zealand "lift its game" to the 2 per cent of GDP mark, especially given that Australia already has done so.
New Zealand's strategic position and threat environment may not readily accord with its current security posture or spending (such as by having an Army-centric military and limited blue water patrol capability in a maritime nation).
But New Zealand's security interests do not uniformly coincide with those of the US and, more importantly, the Trump administration approach to fundamental norms such as the Laws of War and the Geneva Convention.
Moreover, New Zealand's trade position is more vulnerable than that of its larger military partners, which makes blind compliance with US security demands risky when these involve antagonising economic partners such as China.
In the wake of Trump's remarks to Nato and the G7 Forum, German Chancellor Angela Merkel warned Europeans they could not rely on the US on matters of security and trade and needed to look to themselves when determining their fate.
New Zealand needs to heed that advice if it is to maintain its reputation as an honest broker and independent actor in international affairs.
More specifically, the price of its security partnership with the US should not cause it to be held hostage to demands to comply with arbitrary spending thresholds.
• Paul G. Buchanan is the founding director of 36th-Parallel Assessments, a New Zealand based geopolitical and strategic analysis consultancy (www.36th-parallel.com).
