Editorial: Naming victims has a valid purpose

Victims of crime are not routinely given name suppression in this country. Society uses their identity to gain a better understanding of the characteristics of a crime and its response to the offence. In the main, secrecy is reserved for victims of sex offences, especially rape, where the nature of the crime attaches an unjustified stigma. In such instances, public sensibility reinforces the court-imposed protection by ensuring that the identity of a rape victim is not widely disseminated.

Clearly, that view does not extend to the victim of an alleged Wellington kidnap plot. The public would better understand the alleged offence if it could put the victim in some sort of context. Denied an identity it cannot do so. Hence the question on many lips is: "Who is Mr X?"

Inevitably, his name will become known, helped no doubt by foreign news organisations breaching New Zealand court orders with their websites. Such disclosures have led to claims that suppression in these cases is futile. That may be the reality but the New Zealand judiciary will continue to hold the view that it will not be held hostage by delinquent foreign websites.

However, set aside the internet issue and consider the local reality. Mr X's name will be revealed somehow, sometime, if people want to know. And no judge will ultimately have the power to determine what ordinary people may or may not say. Therein lies the real futility in this case, much as it did some years ago in the case of a convicted molester seeking public support for an organ transplant.

Justice Grant Hammond, nonetheless, ruled yesterday that a suppression order on naming Mr X granted on Tuesday would stand. The High Court order keeps secret the victim's name, address, occupation and anything that might lead to his identification. Justice Hammond said public interest in the case was not outweighed by the harm, both actual and potential, of publishing the man's identity. The man had a right to privacy.

On what basis did one man's right to privacy outweigh the principle of open justice? Given that society regards the identification of a victim as important in developing its understanding of the crime, how does the target of a thwarted kidnap plot differ from any other victim? The public is simply left to wonder why he is in need of greater protection. Usually identification - and the supposition that security was increased - would enhance the likelihood that lightning did not strike twice.

A case in 2000 in which this newspaper became embroiled provided some useful guidance in the matter of name suppression. In that year, American billionaire Peter Lewis was discharged without conviction at the Otahuhu District Court after admitting charges of possessing cannabis. He was granted name suppression here but, inevitably, his name was soon published in the United States. Equally inevitable was the speculation that wealth had furnished a benefit denied the hoi polloi. Others apprehended at Auckland airport with an illegal substance were routinely denied name suppression. The important lesson from that case was that the principle of open justice must not lightly be compromised - not even for the wealthy.

It is far easier to be sympathetic to the quest for privacy of a kidnap plot target than a similar demand from a rich visitor caught with cannabis. But the High Court ruling in the billionaire case dictated that courts considering name suppression must satisfy themselves that it is "demonstrably justified" on the facts before them. The Bill of Rights Act, which guards freedom of expression, must be given due weight, alongside the discretion given to judges by the Criminal Justice Act.

In sum, the principle of open justice demands that suppression is granted only in exceptional circumstances. The public does not know this is such a circumstance.