Editorial: Get Saddam or court failure in Iraq

It comes as no surprise that Saddam Hussein's regime may have planned a campaign of resistance to American occupation even before the Iraq war began. A militarily weak Iraq could not expect to triumph in conventional battle; prolonged guerrilla-style conflict must always have appealed as the most likely path to ultimate victory. Thus, there is reason, in principle, to believe that an intelligence service document found in Iraq detailing a plan for looting and sabotage is authentic. And there is reason in practice, given the increasing chaos and guerrilla strikes against coalition soldiers, oil plants and power stations. The difficulty for the Americans lies in assessing whether these attacks are the final fling of Saddam loyalists or a sign of growing unrest that could turn to open revolt.

The danger is that even if this is a last-gasp resistance, it could still be the catalyst for a popular uprising. In all probability, the vast majority of Iraqis want security and stability - and nothing to do with the remnants of Saddam's fedayeen force and Ba'ath party. But, equally, they will soon become disillusioned with the Americans if their lot does not improve - and if promised local autonomy fails to eventuate. As yet, the reconstruction of their country has been frustratingly slow. And still it is civilians, more so than soldiers, who are casualties of the violence.

The aim of Saddam's loyalists is to foment the discontent which is never far below the surface in an occupied country. Most basically, this can be achieved by depriving people of standard amenities, such as water and electricity. Thus, the guerrillas' efforts involve attacks on infrastructure as much as ambushes of the occupying forces. The first mocks the Americans' ability to supply everyday essentials; the second undermines their image of invulnerability and may deter Iraqis from co-operating with them. Additionally, it may provoke security crackdowns of a type that further alienate the populace. Images of chaos are also a strong disincentive to overseas investment.

There is little yet to suggest that Saddam's loyalists are a significant strategic threat to the coalition. Their activities do not, in the words of the United States Army commander, Tommy Franks, spoil the victory. But they do add to the sense of cumulative embarrassment now afflicting the Bush Administration and Blair Government. Added to the failure to find weapons of mass destruction - the main justification for the war - the apparent survival of Saddam is an unpleasant aftermath.

There is an element of failing to finish the job not unlike that experienced in Afghanistan with the Taleban and Osama bin Laden. The capture or confirmed death of Saddam would rid the Americans of many of their problems. At one stroke, the figurehead necessary for any revolt would be removed and Iraqis could bring the curtain down on 35 years of tyranny.

The Americans are well aware of this. A special forces team, Task Force 20, has been assembled to hunt down Saddam. But there is little evidence that special forces units are involved in the day-to-day combating of guerrilla attacks. Troops accustomed to conventional warfare are being used to fight an unconventional enemy. It is a fraught proposition, both in terms of its likely effectiveness and its propensity for estranging an occupying force from the local people.

The longer Saddam's loyalists are allowed to spread chaos, the greater is the chance that Iraq will descend into open revolt. Over the next few months, the US must establish stability by acting decisively against the guerrillas, furnish the basics of life for the Iraqi people, and restore government to their hands. Only that can supply a sheen to the Americans' tarnished image.

Herald Feature: Iraq