Dialogue: PM's defence strategy narrowly isolationist

To suggest that the Air Force's anti-submarine warfare capability is no longer needed smacks of remarkably old-fashioned thinking, says DAVID DICKENS.*

Prime Minister Helen Clark says there is no strong evidence to suggest that New Zealand's maritime patrol force needs to maintain the capability to detect submarines. But what about peacekeeping?

Take, for instance, the views of the maritime commander of Interfet, responsible for all maritime operations during the United Nations intervention in East Timor. He said that Indonesia deployed two West German-made silent and lethal Type T 209 submarines to East Timor in the first days of the UN operation.

They should not have been there and no one in Interfet knew why they had been dispatched. The Indonesian deployment of these submarines was inconsistent with assurances of cooperation they had provided to the UN. These submarines, said Interfet's maritime commander, "were considered an active threat until they retired from the area."

They could have torpedoed any warship, tanker or supply ship carrying soldiers and their equipment. They could have been used as a platform for special-forces attacks on shipping of the type that crippled the USS Cole.

In the event, a flotilla of UN warships and anti-submarine aircraft forced the submarines to retire.

For the Interfet maritime commander, there was a straightforward lesson: "To do peacekeeping, you have to be prepared for torpedo, air attack and missile attack."

New Zealand has lost four soldiers in East Timor over the past 20 months. A submarine attack could have killed hundreds in a matter of minutes.

What of our defence relationship with Australia? A full maritime surveillance and reconnaissance capability is one of the most important contributions New Zealand can make to the defence of Australia.

Australia has 18 Orions to cover its maritime backyard. Six fully equipped New Zealand Orions would make a real difference.

Anti-submarine warfare is something New Zealand has done very well over the past 50 years. Take, for instance, the Orions' record of detecting submarines.

The Prime Minister seemed to confirm, in a radio interview on March 22, the Centre for Strategic Studies' assessment that the Air Force's Orions have routinely detected submarines in East Asia.

According to former Orion aircrew, Soviet nuclear submarines were also detected off the east coast of New Zealand, and two were discovered in the South Pacific, in the 1980s. A Soviet military research submarine (of a type used for military submarine warfare research) was towed to New Zealand waters and was photographed by an Orion in the 1980s. It was towed to reduce wear and tear. When it got to work underwater, it was tracked by Orions.

The Orions' anti-submarine warfare capability is sought by New Zealand's most established friends in Asia, such as Malaysia and Singapore. No state in South-east Asia possesses anti-submarine warfare aircraft. This is why well-equipped Orions make a strategic difference to the security of that region.

It is worth bearing in mind that the ships carrying almost all of New Zealand's exports to East Asia pass through seas that are the scene of some of the world's most contested territorial claims, such as those in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Straits and adjacent waters, and the seas around Korea.

Indonesia only last year tried to bar the right of free passage in a sea lane stretching from Sumatra to East Timor. Oil tankers carrying our energy imports from the Middle East have to pass through the contested waterways of the Gulf. Consequently, New Zealand has a direct interest in the maritime security of South-east Asia and the Middle East.

The issue for New Zealand is whether it wants to play a role.

A maritime patrol force stripped of its anti-submarine warfare capacity will signal a substantial withdrawal from the serious side of security.

This country will be regarded as a security free-loader. The upgrade of the Army (which is important for other good reasons) will not be seen as a substitute in East Asia, Australia or the United States. Most states in Asia are chary about having the land forces of another state on their soil.

At stake is a broader question. What does New Zealand stand for? Are we willing to range ourselves alongside other democracies and small states?

Do we want to stand alongside the weak and threatened when they are bullied by the large?

If Australia gets in trouble, how will we live with knowing that we can't make any real contribution to its defence?

The opinion that anti-submarine warfare capabilities are not needed in the Orions rests on the assumption that New Zealand is interested only in the security of its exclusive economic zone, the southern oceans and the South Pacific.

This is isolationist and remarkably old-fashioned thinking. The world has globalised, changed and grown smaller. The waters around New Zealand could well become the scene of great-power rivalries as they were in the Cold War.

Take, for instance, the sub-surface element of India and China's quest for nuclear balance. India will acquire large nuclear ballistic-missile-firing submarines. It will protect these submarine from Chinese attack with an enlarged fleet of attack submarines.

Some of these attack submarines can be expected to traverse the Tasman Sea and pass the east coast of New Zealand as they take the long route to their targets to avoid detection in the shallow waters of South-east Asia. China's attack submarines will traverse these waters for the same reasons and to track their Indian counterparts.

The waters of New Zealand include ideal places for submarines to play their deadly game of hide and seek. The threat to New Zealand is not of attacks to its shipping but the consequences of accidents, especially if they involve nuclear-armed or powered submarines.

It is worth mentioning that there is well-founded suspicion that some of the saboteurs who attacked the Rainbow Warrior escaped from New Zealand on a yacht which sailed to a rendezvous with the French Amethyste class attack submarine the Rubis.

All of this suggests there is a compelling case for retaining the Air Force's anti-submarine warfare capability.

*Dr David Dickens is director of Victoria University's Centre for Strategic Studies.