Dialogue: Does our Air Force have a future?

12:00 PM - By DAVID DICKENS

Within as little as six months New Zealand may not have an Air Force as we know it. The Skyhawks could be dumped and the Orions converted to civilian roles.

Such a policy would have implications that are difficult to understate. It would have the same effect on the Defence Force as the legal profession being directed to abolish the Law Commission, the Court of Appeal, and the High Court.

It would be the same as forcing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to close half of New Zealand's embassies and high commissions abroad. Canning the Skyhawks and ending the military role of the Orions would reduce the operational effectiveness of the defence force by over 50 per cent.

Not having Skyhawks would free up around $100 million a year. This money could be diverted to cover other defence costs. A hundred million dollars could buy perhaps one new C 130J Hercules transport plane, one or two attack helicopters depending on the type, or an additional 15-16 LAV III armoured vehicles.

However, if New Zealand wants its armed forces to be able to work with others, then its armed forces have to be able to work with combat aircraft. Everybody else in the Western world and East Asia do this. If New Zealand want its forces to be able to work with others then they have to know how to work with fighter aircraft.

For instance, infantry have to know when to call in artillery without shooting down friendly combat aircraft providing close air support. If New Zealand does not have Skyhawks, its military will need to acquire the skill of working with airpower. This will be costly.

If New Zealand were to rely on Australia, it is worth remembering that the Royal Australian Air Force's F-18 aircraft are horrendously expensive to operate. There may not be much spare change from a $100 million.

The military capabilities of the Skyhawks and the Orions are interrelated. Losing one or the other capacity will down-grade the combat and peacekeeping effectiveness of the whole Defence Force. A decision to can the Skyhawks and end the Orion military role would signal New Zealand's rejection of defence technology and established approaches to working with others. This will remove New Zealand from the mainstream.

One implication will be to signal to East Asia that New Zealand is no longer willing to contribute to the security of the region. Defence for East Asian allies like Malaysia and Singapore is done by sea and air.

This is for two reasons. Firstly, they are surrounded by sea which they need to control. Secondly, East Asian states do not like to have another's ground forces in their country.

For this reason, the canning of the Skyhawks and ending of the Orions' military capabilities would significantly diminish New Zealand's capacity to contribute to the security of East Asia. New Zealand would look like a selfish country unwilling to shoulder its responsibilities and only interested in its own enrichment through trade.

Without the military capacity of Skyhawks and Orions, New Zealand would reduce its capacity to contribute to the defence of Australia by two thirds. Australia's defence is based on the control of the sea and air gap to its north. The frigates would be all that New Zealand could contribute.

New Zealand would still be able to assist on lower priority and less important lower level roles. But this is not regarded in Australia as a serious commitment. The Army would still be able to assist in places like East Timor and elsewhere in the South Pacific but would risk being a liability should conflict escalate. This worries most middle level army officers.

Ironically, canning the Skyhawks and ending the Orions' military capacity will substantially reduce New Zealand's peacekeeping capacity. These kinds of capabilities are needed to protect peacekeepers on the ground and their vulnerable supply tail of supply planes and ships. Such a capacity proved to be vital in East Timor. As General Cosgrove himself said, not a single soldier would have stepped ashore in East Timor unless they had been protected by sea and air combat forces.

Our troops are still in East Timor. Should circumstances change and if the troops needed to be pulled out in a hurry they would need protection again. New Zealand would earn the dubious honour of taking away the higher level protection for troops on active service if it canned the Skyhawks while its soldiers were still serving in East Timor.

If New Zealand was to get rid of its fighters and Orion capability it would signal a country that has lost confidence in itself. New Zealand has always been able to afford an Air Force with fighter aircraft and combat maritime surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft. Every other credible peacekeeping contributor funds these capabilities, as do all other western states of significance and most countries in East Asia. It would signal New Zealand's withdrawing from the defence and peacekeeping mainstream.

Other countries have faced similar problems with their defence. Belgium, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Australia and Canada have all risen to the challenge and found ways around funding problems without giving up core capabilities.

Ending these two capabilities would be to end New Zealand's capacity to enforce its non-nuclear legislation. New Zealand could not know, and could do little about, nuclear submarines or warships in its territorial waters.

Canning the Skyhawks and combat capacity of the Orions will insidiously reduce the combat effectiveness of the New Zealand Defence Force. It will leave New Zealand unprepared to respond to negative changes in our strategic environment. Defence Force personnel in all three services know this. This is the most important reason why New Zealand defence force morale has collapsed in most camps and bases.

Decisions on these issues have grave and mostly negative consequences that are largely unrecognised and appreciated beyond the military profession and a few observers. Contemplation of radical decisions should be matched by thinking through the consequences.

* Dr David Dickens is Director of Victoria University's Centre for Strategic Studies.