Robert White: Nuclear potential undeniable factor

Colin James wrote in a Herald article this week that the taskforce set up by the National Party last year to look at our nuclear legislation concluded from talks in Washington that Section 11 of our Nuclear Free Zone Act banning the entry of nuclear-powered ships is now "at the heart of our problems with the US", not the anti-weapons sections.

Most would agree, since it is widely accepted that since 1992 United States Navy surface ships and their smaller attack submarines, the classes of nuclear-powered vessels that visited us until 1984, do not at present carry nuclear weapons.

This implies a delinking of the nuclear propulsion problem from the nuclear weapons problem. But it can be argued that this will never be possible as long as the major nuclear powers retain nuclear weapons.

The only countries operating nuclear-powered vessels are the major nuclear powers.

Apart from a few Russian icebreakers, these are all warships developed as fundamental elements of the nuclear strategies of these powers. Their function was to deploy nuclear weapons over large distances on ships that did not have to be refuelled regularly.

The large, deep-sea, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines of the nuclear navies still fulfil this purpose. The only ships now carrying nuclear weapons are nuclear-propelled.

Those concerned with the grave threat existing nuclear weapons arsenals pose recognise this intimate link between naval nuclear power and nuclear weapons.

Should we weaken our nuclear legislation by repealing our ban, much of the world would immediately see this as the end of our widely respected nuclear-free status. We would be considered to again be supporting the nuclear strategies of the US - the only country pressing us to lift this ban - as we did under the Muldoon government and earlier National governments.

National's argument - quoted by James - that repealing Section 11 "does not mean we need to accept nuclear-powered ships' visits" reflects an astonishing lack of understanding of the Danish nuclear policy regarding such visits, despite having this policy explained to them verbally and in writing.

This brings us to what is the real nub of "our problem with the US".

Denmark has had no visits by nuclear-powered vessels since 1964. Denmark had concerns about the safety of naval nuclear reactors at that time but, as a member of Nato, had a diplomatic problem in trying to avoid visits by US nuclear-powered ships.

It devised a successful strategy. It said nuclear-powered ships could enter its ports only if details of the reactors were supplied so Danish authorities could assess their safety.

It surely knew that the US Navy never discloses this information. Nevertheless, this left the ultimate decision in the hands of the US.

Give the Danes the information and have such visits, or refuse it and abandon these visits. The Danes chose the latter course, but allowed visits by conventional ships and had no problems.

New Zealand, by contrast, in 1984 gave an unequivocal "no" to the nuclear powers: No matter what you do we will not allow visits by your nuclear-powered ships.

No one says no to the US and gets away with it easily, if at all. The British have sent Navy ships here since 1995, but not the US.

This is the real nub of the "problem" we still have with the US. National's taskforce somehow concluded that Denmark also banned these visits but only by policy not by law, as we did in 1987.

On the basis of this misunderstanding National has argued, wrongly, that if we change our law just to a policy, the US might - as with Denmark - not send nuclear-powered ships here and restore good relations.

So do we repeal this ban and mollify the US at the cost of our own international standing as a truly nuclear free nation? This we must not do. There is a very sound reason for standing firm on our policy.

US attack submarines, unlike their surface warships, retain the capability to carry nuclear weapons should the US Government decide so to re-arm them. About 300 nuclear-armed cruise missiles suitable for deploying on these submarines are in storage in the US ready for use.

Given the aggressive nuclear policies of the US Administration and their retention of the policy of not confirming or denying the nuclear-armed status of particular warships, we will never know if these missiles have been mounted on submarines.

If we repeal our ban, this is the type of US nuclear-powered ship that would be most likely to visit our ports - possibly one that is nuclear-armed.

Is even the possibility of this happening what we want to allow?

The answer must be no. Naval "nuclear engines" and nuclear weapons cannot be delinked while the US is a nuclear weapons power. And they intend to remain so for many years.

* Robert White is director of the Centre for Peace Studies at the University of Auckland