Roger Partridge: The myth of public service neutrality

How do we appoint departmental chief executives? Photo / 123rf

OPINION

Earlier in the year, this column argued for a public service reset. It was prompted partly by the ballooning size of public sector headcount. But it was more a response to the decline in public service outcomes. Everyone should be concerned about the deteriorating state of core services like education, health, and law and order. And the bureaucracy should expect to be held accountable.

The column also focused on the growing phenomenon of activist civil servants when, traditionally, they have at least given the appearance of political neutrality. Former Te Whatu Ora chairman Rob Campbell is the most prominent of them. But the first half of the year was peppered with copycat outbursts from senior public servants.

But are our public servants still “neutral”? And if they are not, is the architecture of the public service fit for purpose?

At least when it comes to the upper echelons of the public service today, the answer to both questions is a resounding no.

Let’s start with the myth of neutrality. All that is needed to debunk it is an understanding of how departmental chief executives are now appointed.

Under the Public Service Act 2020, ministers and the government of the day are closely involved in chief executive appointment processes. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say they control the process.

Ministers can influence the composition of appointment panels. They can specify matters the appointment panel “must” take into account when deciding who to recommend for appointment. Once a candidate is selected, Cabinet may then either accept or reject the panel’s recommendation. If Cabinet rejects the recommendation, it may direct the Public Service Commissioner to appoint a particular person chief executive.

The idea that a process with such built-in levels of political influence results in politically neutral departmental chief executives is simply fanciful. Appointment panels can be expected to appoint chief executives who are on side with the world view of the government of the day.

Good arguments can be made for and against this level of political control. Canvassing them is beyond the scope of this column. For present purposes, the point is simply this: senior public servant appointment processes are now deeply politicised.

This has profound implications for understanding the functioning of the public service. And it raises an important question about what should happen to department chief executives after a change of government.

As matters stand, following an election, incoming ministers are stuck with the incumbent appointees of their predecessors.

This position is clearly asymmetrical. Incumbent ministers can ensure the appointment of a chief executive whose viewpoints align with government policies. Yet incoming ministers with a democratic mandate to bring about policy and operational change cannot.

Instead, they may be saddled with chief executives who have radically different and potentially conflicting views. Think policing policy, teaching pedagogy, or views on the efficacy of central planning over markets.

Even if civil servants’ views are aligned, their skill sets may not be. A CEO competent in managing the status quo is of no use when expertise in change management is needed.

Few areas of public policy are free from philosophical values. It is naive to think that an incoming government will not face departmental chief executives whose values are aligned with the outgoing government. The saga involving Rob Campbell illustrates this position well enough (accepting that Campbell was chairman of a Crown entity rather than a departmental chief executive).

Rob Campbell, former chairman of Te Whatu Ora-Health New Zealand.

It is also now naive to think that a conflict of views between incoming ministers and their chief executives can be addressed simply by “professionalism”. Today’s politicised public service means that is a formula for frustration, conflict, and dysfunction.

Other jurisdictions address this problem by permitting a new government to appoint new departmental chief executives.

The United States is the prime example, where thousands of political appointments to the executive follow a change of president. Less-extreme examples, which have institutionalised a more coherent approach than in New Zealand, include Australia and Germany.

The Australian solution

Australia may provide the most useful example.

Within hours of becoming prime minister last year, Labour’s Anthony Albanese announced he was moving to dump the nation’s top public servant, Phil Gaetjens, as the head of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Within a week, Albanese had appointed Glyn Davis, former University of Melbourne vice-chancellor, in Gaetjens’ place.

Albanese’s express intent was reshaping the bureaucracy to implement the new government’s policy priorities. Within a month, he had appointed new departmental secretaries for three other departments critical to his reform agenda.

Albanese’s actions were hardly unprecedented. Gaetjens himself had been hand-picked by Scott Morrison following the Australian federal election in 2019.

The practice of changing departmental heads after an election in Australia is enabled by legislation. The Australian Public Service Act 1999 allows the Prime Minister to recommend that the Governor-General either appoint or dismiss heads of government departments.

Upon termination, if the Commonwealth has not made an offer of suitable alternative employment, a departmental secretary is entitled to up to 12 months’ remuneration as compensation for loss of office. (As in New Zealand, chief executive appointments are for statutory fixed terms of up to five years, with provision for extension for a further fixed period.)

Australia’s approach provides a blueprint for public service reform in New Zealand. It recognises senior public servants are political appointees. And it provides a break mechanism to avoid an incoming government being hobbled by unsuitable public service leaders.

A neutral public service might be an appealing ideal. But in New Zealand, it is a myth. Our public service architecture should recognise this.

– Roger Partridge is chairman of the New Zealand Initiative.