"He was resuscitated but never regained consciousness and later died in hospital."
The doors were normally set to "local-control mode", which meant they would not automatically close after someone had walked through. At the time of the accident, the doors were in "remote-close mode", when they would automatically close when the user released the opening handle.
The report said the door had been set to close at twice the allowable closing speed, which would have probably contributed to the accident.
The chief engineer, an Australian of Sri Lankan descent, possibly tried to pass through the door before it was fully opened and "for some reason it began closing and trapped him".
"It is possible that the audible alarm warning that the door was closing, was not working at the time," the report said. "A failure of the audible alarm may have contributed to the accident."
The commission's investigation found the water-tight door did not comply with the minimum requirements of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. The safety management systems on board did not ensure the doors were maintained in line with regulations or good marine engineering standards.
The commission recommended Maritime New Zealand and the International Marine Organisation "address" the issue of water-tight door safety. It also wanted the Australian Maritime Safety Authority to address issues with the safety management system on board the Oceanic Discoverer.
The manufacturer of the water-tight doors would also have to look at possible design issues, while the International Association of Classified Societies and its surveyor members would be alerted to the safety issues outlined in the report, so they would be aware when conducting tests and surveys on water tight doors.