Claims that a man's trial on sex charges was unfair because of a jury's social distancing in Napier District Court have been dismissed. Photo / NZME
Claims that a man's trial on sex charges was unfair because of a jury's social distancing in Napier District Court have been dismissed. Photo / NZME
Claims that a man's trial on sex charges was unfair because of a jury's social distancing in Napier District Court have been dismissed in a rare last court of resort decision by the Supreme Court.
At a trial in September last year, Ford Tearikiwai Huka Taylor, aged in the mid-40s,denied charges of sexually violating and indecently assaulting a young girl but was found guilty and sentenced to three years and one month in Jail.
He failed in an appeal against conviction in the High Court in July, and has now failed in a bid to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which was established in 2004, as New Zealand's court of last resort.
It replaced the previous right of appeal to Commonwealth institution the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, used most notably in New Zealand cases in recent years in the turning-over of David Bain's convictions for murdering five of his family in Dunedin 1994 and Teina Pora's convictions on murder and other changes relating to the death of Susan Burdett in Auckland in 1992.
The latest case was taken to the Supreme Court by Taylor's defence counsel, Eric Forster, and the judgment of Justices William Young, Susan Glazebrook and Mark O'Regan on Tuesday.
The judges said the trial was conducted with Covid-19 physical distancing as required of the jury which meant half the 12-strong panel could not at the same time see Taylor nor the screen on which the complainant's evidence was being relayed.
The jury asked the Judge if the seating arrangements could be altered so all the panel could see the defendant and the complainant at the same time, but was told by the Judge it could not be changed.
A second level of the appeal was that the child's mother had during evidence for the prosecution divulged that Taylor's mother, a defence alibi witness, had served time in prison. The Judge had at the time told jurors it was irrelevant and later directed them to put the evidence "to one side".
Forster wished to argue that the trial judge was wrong in not accommodating the jury's request for a change in seating arrangements and also wrong not to discharge the jury after it had been told of the imprisonment of Taylor's mother, which was for fraud and unrelated to the charges against her son.
The Court of Appeal concluded Taylor did not have a right to have all jurors seated so they could see both he and the complainant at the same time and it was not persuaded the decision not to abort the trial was in error.
The Supreme Court judges said they saw no "appearance of a miscarriage of justice" and dismissed the application for leave to appeal.
