Whakaari disaster inquest examines if a faster response could have saved lives. Photo / Supplied
By Victor Waters of RNZ
The coronial inquest into the Whakaari/White Island disaster has begun to look into how emergency services responded to the 2019 eruption and whether decisions impacted the chances of survival for those on the island.
The eruption killed 22 people and seriously injured 25 others on December 9, 2019.
Anna Adams, counsel assisting the bereaved families and the survivors, said questions remained over why help didn’t arrive sooner.
She had previously told the inquest that 39 people were rescued from the island on the day of the eruption, entirely by civilian boats and helicopters.
Adams said the timing of treatment from emergency services could have played a role in survivability.
“The primary issue that they have - or question rather than they have - is why the official rescue and associated medical care didn’t come sooner than it did.
“The bereaved family and survivors are not asking for a granular analysis of the rescue in every aspect, they’re really focused on that question - why it didn’t come sooner than it did?”
Adams emphasised that the last rescue that led to any survival was a civilian helicopter, which left the island 90 minutes after the eruption and arrived to medical care about half an hour later.
“That’s the latest evacuation, which led to survival.
“Could help have come sooner? Could medical care have come sooner?
“I think the question of survivability is yet to be explored and can only really be looked at through two lenses.
“One is through sheer timing and the other one is the medical evidence, which is coming at the end of the inquest.”
Adams said a two-hour window after the eruption would have been crucial for patients to get medical treatment and increase their chances of survival.
The inquiry heard that police had access to a Whakaari/White Island eruption response plan before the 2019 incident, but they did not have in-depth understanding of this plan and actions, and it was not used as a focal point of emergency services response on the day.
Superintendent Andrew McGregor, who was Bay of Plenty district commander at the time, gave evidence on Wednesday.
Adams asked him what use was the eruption plan to police, if it was never used. McGregor said he relied on those under his command to ensure plans are well developed regardless.
“I wouldn’t hazard to guess how many plans we have in the Bay of Plenty district, let alone New Zealand Police.
“What I would say is that we do practise emergencies or response to emergencies within police, and also with other agencies, and we do that on a regular basis, but we did not carry out a plan in relation to a White Island explosion.”
He denied police were effectively improvising on December 9.
“I look at what occurred and a lot of it actually followed the plan of what occurred,” McGregor said. “Could we have done it any better?
“I’d be worried if I had people walking around, referring to the plan, wanting to know what to do, because of what I call the experience, the knowledge, in terms of this is the best practice in relation to what should occur.
“The answer to that would probably be no.”
The coroner was also told that the Major Operations Centre (MOC) in Wellington ordered that no one physically set foot on the island just before 5pm that day.
The Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) in Whakatāne also came to that conclusion, but wasn’t made aware of the MOC’s decision for about 30 minutes.
McGregor couldn’t recall direct communication between MOC and EOC that day, when asked by Coroner Marcus Elliott.
It’s understood the decision was made after advice from GNS Science – the national science agency – which said the volcano would likely erupt again and it would be unsafe.
The former police officer, who retired in 2023, said it wasn’t his decision not to immediately send emergency services on to the island.
He accepted questioning from Adams that, by the time authorities decided not to send first responders to Whakaari/White Island, the potential window to save any remaining survivors was too late.
McGregor said that, while they didn’t follow the Whakaari/White Island eruption plan, many of their actions were included in the plan.
He pointed to the fact that, within the plan and his expectations at the time, tour operators would initiate the evacuation, including civilian helicopter services.
“This was the plan per se.
“I still think that the most appropriate way was for the tour operators themselves to self-evacuate as quickly as possible, and then we come in and assist with those that haven’t been evacuated, if they’re still alive.”
Another question considered by this inquest is who was the lead agency in the response to the Whakaari/White Island tragedy.
McGregor said Civil Defence was the lead agency, but that police would be the lead agency in the search and rescue operation.
He said a dividing line between a search and rescue operation and a more general emergency response was difficult.
“The army refer to something called the ‘fog of war’ and that is, basically, there’s a lot of confusion that reigns.”
“There’s no clear lines of demarcation with that. It’s relying on the ability of people to be able to get together, collaborate together, co-ordinate resources and activities to deploy to get the best possible result, and you can’t train for that.”
It was revealed at the inquiry that the first 111 call about the eruption arrived at about 2.16pm that day and that information took about nine minutes to reach dispatchers to respond.
McGregor said it was “a possibility” that dispatchers may not have alerted external agencies as soon as they could have, although he said they were dealing with other unrelated incidents at the time also.
On the day of the eruption, McGregor was in Wellington on other business and returned to Whakatāne immediately, after he was notified of the incident.
He arrived at the EOC, set up at the Whakatāne Council building, at about 5.30pm.
Police, Civil Defence and local iwi were among the agencies involved at the EOC, but Hato Hone St John was not present.
McGregor said the EOC was “technically” the central decision-making place, but he noted that the building had trouble with Wi-Fi connectivity and there was poor signal strength for phone data coverage, which hampered police’s ability to send and receive information.
There was also no police radio at the EOC during the early stages of the emergency services response. McGregor said the centre at the time was a communications “black spot”.