Evacuations are perceived to have been chaotic, with no apparent functional chain of command. But for the defiance and bravery of a few taking the initiative, many more people would have died.
Communities cut off without roads, power or communications for days and weeks compounded the severity and impacts on the region.
In the face of so many apparent shortcomings in this disaster, there are obvious questions to be asked about the performance of the region’s Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group (CDEM).
CDEM performance
The central brief for CDEM is to protect lives when disaster strikes. The imperative is to identify hazards, mitigate risks and ensure an effective emergency response plan is in place.
Over the past decade, CDEM reports identify flooding as the most widespread and frequent hazard within the region.
CDEM acknowledges in its plans that flood warning management and research play critical roles in helping to achieve the protection of human life and safety.
As far back as 2012, a Joint Hazard Strategy identified serious gaps in the region’s flood management capability.
Absent from the various publicly available reports and committee proceedings since that time is anything like due diligence in research, risk assessment and emergency response planning for floods as the region’s biggest hazard.
A 2019 CDEM capability report sent a clear warning to the Joint Committee about its vulnerabilities. The report highlighted an over-centralised structure and inconsistent risk management plans. The report required an immediate review of operating procedures.
In particular, the report identified risk around the effectiveness of CDEM’s lifeline planning and capability.
Following the report, there is no record of a flood warning risk assessment taking place. Nor are there assessment records of other vital lifelines such as cell tower vulnerabilities, emergency back-up communications, or threats to the road network and bridges.
There is no publicly available evidence that CDEM assessed the risk to the region’s power supply or advocacy for relocation of the Redclyffe substation.
An alert system review came up with the brilliant idea to replace the old siren and ‘stinger’ mobile alert technology with a fully cellphone-based system. Siren alerts were seen as no longer fit for purpose.
The obvious problem with cellphone alerts is their vulnerability in the event of the cellular network crashing. The decision by CDEM to adopt this approach, abandoning back-up options, is extraordinary in the absence of considering the risks associated with a cellular system.
The 2020 Napier flood event raised a further red flag around the CDEM command and control structure. A report to CDEM identified a lack of co-ordination between the co-ordinating executive group, local emergency centre and Fire and Emergency New Zealand services.
Responsibility and accountability
CDEM is governed by a joint standing committee of local councils. Our mayor and regional council chairwoman are responsible and accountable for the performance of the CDEM Joint Committee.
Our region’s leaders carry an extra burden of responsibility, as they have fully delegated authority to vote and make decisions without recourse to their respective councils.
While describing relationships as excellent, the 2019 capability report identified CDEM governance leadership as having a sporadic understanding of risk management and a lack of risk awareness. Gaps in risk management policy and processes were identified.
CDEM performance is now under the spotlight. So far, there has not been a response from the Joint Committee. There have been no assurances given by CDEM governors to deflect the growing narrative in the community about its performance.
To restore public confidence, a prudent course of action for the Joint Committee is to step aside. The equivalent of a commissioner is needed to undertake an urgent CDEM capability review and to make the necessary changes to protect our community from future disasters.
Neil Kirton is a Hawke’s Bay Regional Councillor.
