After half a century of stasis, there are big new strategic realities in the Middle East, but people are having trouble getting their heads around them. Take the United States, for example. Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State in President Obama's first administration, is still lamenting her former boss' failure
Middle-East's new realities
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TAKEOFF: An F/A-18 fighter leaves a carrier to patrol over Iraq.
By now, he has also presumably abandoned his proposal of last June to spend US$500 million to train and equip "appropriately vetted" Syrian opposition fighters.
But Obama has not yet dropped the other shoe. A lot of people have not dropped their other shoes yet. They all know that the whole strategic environment has changed. They realise that may require new policies and even new allies. Changing horses in midstream is always a tricky business, so the realignments are only slowly getting underway, but you can see where they are going to go.
The proclamation of the "Islamic State" in eastern Syria and northern and western Iraq has large implications for every country in the Middle East, but for the great powers it is almost the only thing they still care about in the region. They all have Muslim minorities of their own, and they all want the Islamic State stopped, or at the very least isolated, contained and quarantined.
That means that both the Syrian and Iraqi governments must survive, and they will probably get enough outside help to do so (although it will take time for the US and the major European powers to switch sides and openly back Assad). The army of the Iraqi Kurds might hold its own against the Islamic State if it had better weapons, so it will get them (although Baghdad will not welcome a more powerful Kurdish army).
Containing the Islamic State to the north will be a simpler task, because Iran and Turkey are very big, well organised states whose populations are relatively invulnerable to the ISIS brand of Sunni fundamentalism. But to the south of the Islamic State is Saudi Arabia, which faces some tough decisions.
The Wahhabi strand of Sunni Islam, which is Saudi Arabia's official religion, is very close to the beliefs of the jihadis who rule the Islamic State to their north. Much of their financial support and even their weapons have come from Saudi Arabia. But the rulers of that kingdom would be extremely unwise to assume the jihadis regard Saudi Arabia's political arrangements as legitimate, or that gratitude would restrain them.
Nor will the long-standing US alliance with Saudi Arabia endure if Saudi ties to the jihadis are not broken.
The Iranian-US rapprochement will continue and the issue of Iran's alleged nuclear weapons ambitions will be settled amicably despite Israel's protests.
Further afield, General Sisi's new regime in Egypt can count on strong US support, and may even be encouraged by Washington to intervene militarily in Libya and shut down the Islamist militias there.
Tunisia will be the only remaining flower of the "Arab Spring", although there has also been a certain amount of progress in Morocco. But in the heartland of the Arab world, war will flourish and democracy will not.