The endless death toll in Afghanistan forced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to pull his forces out of Kabul in 1988 leaving the mujahideen in control. Photo / AP

The endless death toll in Afghanistan forced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to pull his forces out of Kabul in 1988 leaving the mujahideen in control. Photo / AP

It is eight years into the war in Afghanistan, and the most senior defence official running the conflict considers a letter from one of his officers. It is a depressing list of political and tactical failures.

"We should honestly admit that our efforts have not led to the expected results. Huge material resources and considerable casualties did not produce a positive end result - stabilisation of military-political situation in the country. The protracted character of the military struggle and the absence of any serious success, which could lead to a breakthrough in the entire strategic situation, led to the formation in the minds of the majority of the population of the mistrust in the abilities of the regime."

"The experience of the past years clearly shows that the Afghan problem cannot be solved by military means only.

"We should decisively reject our illusions and undertake principally new steps, taking into account the lessons of the past, and the real situation in the country."

The date is August 17, 1987. The writer Colonel K. Tsagalov is addressing the newly appointed Soviet Defence Minister, Dmitry Yazov.

Fast-forward 22 years to the confidential briefing paper prepared for President Barack Obama by the senior US general in Afghanistan, Stanley McChrystal, in August 2009, eight years into the United States-led invasion of Afghanistan.

"The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and Isaf's [International Security Assistance Force's] own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their Government," McChrystal argued in a document leaked to Bob Woodward of the Washington Post. He said the consequence had been a "crisis of confidence among Afghans. Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents".

The American led-effort, wrote McChrystal, was labouring under its own illusions regarding its competence.

"Afghan social, political, economic, and cultural affairs are complex and poorly understood. [Nato and the US] does not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics in local communities, nor how the insurgency, corruption, incompetent officials, power-brokers, and criminality all combine to affect the Afghan population."

In Washington the talk has been of a "Vietnam moment". But what if Afghanistan is not the new Vietnam but rather "the new Afghanistan"?