WikiLeaks cable: NZ follow-up: HSPD-6 terrorist lookout information sharing initiative

September 23, 2005
NZ follow-up: HSPD-6 terrorist lookout information sharing initiative



B. STATE 158827

Classified By: Charge D'Affaires David R. Burnett,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S) Post IWG agencies met to discuss Ref A and B. We
also discussed the possibility of the terrorist lookout
information sharing pilot with Conoff in Auckland. Agencies
all agree that GNZ would be a good candidate for the proposed
pilot project, and would likely be receptive should we make
this request. If Washington decides to pursue this project,
we recommend that, as a first step, Post raise the issue with
Mary Anne Thompson, Deputy Secretary at the Department of
Labour. Thompson is currently charged with overseeing much
of NZ's immigration policy, including counter-terrorism
measures. She is an invaluable behind-the-scenes Embassy

Thompson has worked as a staffer for two Prime
Ministers and has in the past provided us with valuable
insights about how best to sell U.S. policies within GNZ.
She is also generally sympathetic with USG counter-terrorism
policies in the region.

2. (S) Agencies also reviewed the questions provided Ref B,
and offer the following preliminary answers. We should be
able to provide more detailed information if and when we are
instructed to approach GNZ on this issue:

A. (SBU) What, if any, arrangements already exist for the
systematic sharing of terrorist lookout information with GNZ?

-- (S) Post Liaison officers, PE, and DCM all regularly
share information with GNZ at Washington's request. GNZ
regularly, and informally, shares information with CONS in
Auckland at the working level. NSA and GCSB (NZ's NSA
equivalent) also regularly share information. With the
exception of NSA/GCSB exchanges, which are automated, all
post/GNZ information is exchanged through person-to-person

B) Does the GNZ currently maintain unclassified lookout
information on individuals based on terrorist-related
information? Does the GNZ maintain classified or restricted
lookout information on individuals based on terrorist-related

-- (S) Airlines maintain unclassified passenger lists.
Customs maintains an unclassified database for use by
Immigration's border control agents. The data includes tips
for identification, and may also advise agents to contact
authorities if a person in the data base is positively
identified. Customs also maintains classified data bases.

C) If the answer to either or both question is yes, how is
this information maintained? Is it consolidated in one
database or are there multiple databases with this
information? Are these databases automated?

-- (S) As noted above, there are separate databases, all of
which are automated. The unclassified Customs/Immigration
databases include unclassified instructions based on
information contained in the classified Customs database.
Many of the "tips" for identification included in the
unclassified databases are based on information that post

liaisons have provided to GNZ via the NZ Security Services
(NZSIS). GNZ agencies are currently trying to improve their
internal data sharing. Our Consular Section Chief notes that
the data GNZ has provided the Consulate is usually of high
quality and seems readily retrievable.

D) Which biographic elements are included in the GNZ's
terrorist-related lookout system(s) (examples: name, date of
birth, citizenship, passport number, mother's maiden
name). Are biometrics, specifically fingerprints, associated
with the lookout system(s)?

-- (S) All the referenced data points are included in GNZ's
classified databases, assuming the agencies have that
information. Most information is included in the
unclassified databases as well. The classified databases

also include individual's distinguishing marks. Although
police have some biometrics (fingerprints) in their database,
to our knowledge these are not included in the lookout system

E) Which biographic and/or biometric elements on an
individual are considered mandatory for the GNZ to use that
information in the country's terrorist-related lookout
system(s)? What are the definitions and evidentiary standards
used by the GNZ to determine whether an individual gets
placed on the terrorist-related lookout system?

-- (S) Post is not familiar with GNZ procedures in this area.
F) With the GNZ under which department or entities are the
terrorist-related lookout systems maintained? What are the
internal sharing arrangements? Does the host-country
share terrorist information with other countries, i.e. Brunei
and Singapore?

-- (S) See above for information regarding which agencies
maintain lookout systems, as well as internal sharing
systems. From time to time, GNZ officials have told us that
they are sharing terrorist information with other countries,
but we are not familiar with any formal mechanisms that may
be in place to facilitate such exchanges.

G) How does the GNZ use terrorist-related lookout information
in screening processes? For the screening of visa applicants?
For screening at ports of entry? For internal law enforcement
purposes? For any other screening purposes?

-- (S) GNZ uses its terrorist-related lookout information to
screen visa applicants and applicants at the port of entry.
Recently, GNZ missions abroad made a couple of high-profile
immigration errors concerning former members of Saddam's
regime. As a result, GNZ is in the process of changing its
visa-processing system so that all visa decisions involving
countries of concern will be adjudicated by GNZ officials in
Wellington. (SBU) During the recent election campaign, GNZ
officials said that 63 individuals had been barred entry into
New Zealand over the past two years because they had been
positively identified in GNZ lookout systems as security

H) Which legal authorities guide the GNZ's use of
terrorist-related lookout information?

-- (S) The Counter-terrorism Act of 2002, as amended, is the
primary legislation guiding GNZ's counter-terrorism lookout
data bases and related policies.

I) How do any of the GNZ's privacy laws or their equivalent
influence the use of terrorist-related information?

-- (S) GNZ's counter-terrorism provisions have been
criticized by some, including the Green Party, as being an
infringement of privacy. However, the Attorney General sent
a report to Parliament in 2002 that said nothing in New
Zealand's primary Counter-terrorism legislation (The
Counter-terrorism Bill 2002) appeared inconsistent with the
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.

J) Does the GNZ have legal authorities or instruments to make
terrorist-related lookout information accessible to other
countries? Are there impediments that could inhibit
making this terrorist-related information accessible to other
countries? Does the GNZ have an equivalent entity to the
Terrorist Screening Center?

-- (S) Given our intelligence-sharing relationship with New
Zealand, we are not aware of any impediments to GNZ's sharing
with us of any terrorist-related lookout information. As we
have noted, such exchanges already take place. We are not
familiar with NZ policies concerning exchanges with other
countries. There is no GNZ equivalent to the Terrorist
Screening Center, although as we noted above GNZ is making an
effort to improve screening coordination among its various

- Herald on Sunday

Get the news delivered straight to your inbox

Receive the day’s news, sport and entertainment in our daily email newsletter


© Copyright 2016, NZME. Publishing Limited

Assembled by: (static) on production apcf04 at 11 Dec 2016 04:39:16 Processing Time: 929ms