It is difficult to know what will become of the newly declared Islamic State carved out of large conquered areas of Syria and Iraq. But it would certainly be wrong to deny its reality or to imagine that any time soon it will cease to be a factor in the confused situation in the region. A map dating back to the colonial era is being redrawn, and the caliphate created by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham will not be the only new entity. Kurdistan, the semi-autonomous region in the oil-rich northeast of Iraq, is also poised to achieve its dream of independence.
The latter occurrence will be widely regarded as benign. Only Turkey and Iran will have major concerns because of the threat that an independent Kurdistan will encourage separatism within their own Kurdish minorities. But the Islamic State formed by a radical Sunni offshoot of al-Qaeda is an altogether different matter. It has no shortage of enemies, not least because of the brutal way in which it has intensified sectarian conflict between Shia and Sunni. This rivalry was unleashed by the ill-considered American invasion of Iraq, a country with a clear Shiite majority but ruled by Sunnis for much of the past century. A virtual civil war flared in 2006-7, to be succeeded today by Isis forces claiming much of the Sunni-dominated region of Iraq, including the second city of Mosul.
Fears that Isis would march on Baghdad were always overstated and have now receded. That is no thanks to the Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, whose non-inclusive approach first provoked the Sunni rebellion. Despite misgivings about his approach, the failure to select a new government in the wake of elections in April has meant opponents of Isis have had no option but to throw their support behind him. Most pertinently, thousands of Shia militiamen have flooded into Baghdad to bolster the demoralised regular army.
Securing the Iraqi capital is one thing. But retaking the ground now occupied by the Islamic State will be altogether more difficult. It would be naive to think that Iraqi forces, underpinned by support from Iran, a fellow Shiite nation, and the United States and Russia will be able to dislodge Isis easily, killing off its state in the process. The danger is that it will endure and act as a breeding ground for terrorism. And that there may be no shortage of recruits to the Isis cause, whether from young Sunnis across the Arab world who live under oppressive secular regimes, or other young people disenchanted with Western culture.
In Mosul and the Syrian city of Raqqa, the Islamic State has shown its hand. A brutal and bigoted version of Sharia law has been imposed. Shia buildings have been blown up, and there is a ban on tobacco, liquor and women going out uncovered or without a chaperone. In the end, the fate of the caliphate will be decided by the reaction of moderate Sunnis to such strictures. More immediately, the hostile forces arrayed against it will be intent on neutralising the "new era of international jihad" pledged by the Islamic State's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Anything resembling the restoration of the original 7th Century caliphate of Mohamed seems highly unlikely.
But the ultimate demise of the Islamic state lies with moderates who still think that a modern and democratic Middle East is the way forward. Steps in that direction in Iraq evaporated with the departure of American forces three years ago. Nonetheless, further international intervention now would be a mistake. The extremists' appeal would only be enhanced. The Islamic State will prosper only if it is fuelled by the sort of misconceived manipulation that cultivated the present chaos.
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